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ABSTRACT
This research effort analyzed selected General Accounting
Office (GAO) sustained protest reviews related to Department
of Defense Acquisitions for the period 1975 through 1978.
The essence of this study was to determine if beneficial
lessons could be drawn that would potentially improve the
acquisition and contracting process. Using this research
methodology, causes of protests were identified which, if
corrected, would improve the process. Among these were mem-
ber or agency conduct, policy interpretation, training,
obsolescence or conflict of regulations, and untimely dissemi-
nation of new, applicable policy interpretations. Although
the results of some GAO decisions are widely publicized, many
others are not. Acquisition policy is sensitive to GAO de-
cisions when changes in the Defense Acquisition Regulations
(DAR) are specified. Likewise, individual Services and the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) are sensitive, because GAO
makes recommendations to the Service Secretaries and to the
Director of DLA. This study concluded that further analysis
of sustained GAO and Agency protest reviews could be fruitful
areas for further study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Department of Defense (DOD) acquisitions are conducted
in accordance with procedures specified in the Defense
Acquisition Regulations (DAR) . These regulations incorpor-
ate applicable Public Laws and other governmental agency
procedures which impact on Defense procurement. Incorpor-
ating these other procedures is necessitated by the fact
that the DAR addresses the entire acquisition and contract-
ing process from inception to completion. Additionally, as
an agency of the public sector, the Department of Defense
is responsible to equitably apply all legal governmental
requirements to the private sector.
One such procedure, steeped both in public law and
principles of equitable application, are those dealing with
disputes of award, hereinafter referred to as protests.
Protest procedures have evolved separately from other
contract dispute procedures. This is so because formal dis-
pute procedures apply only to those instances in which
privity of contact between private concerns and the Govern-
ment exists. In order to give standing to parties inter-
ested in bidding on Government contracts, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) , an arm of the United States Congress,
has established protest procedures. These procedures, apply-
ing to all Government acquisition and contracting agencies,
are published by the GAO as part of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) [40] , and are incorporated into the DAR.
[38: 2-407.8]
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GAO assumes protest review authority under the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921. The following excerpts of the
1921 Act are incorporated in the existing U. S. Code:
The Budget and Accounting Act grants GAO authority
to settle and adjust all claims and demands whatever
by the Government of the United States or against it,
and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the
United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor.
[36] In settlement of public accounts, balances
certified by the General Accounting Office shall be
final and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the
Government. [37]
Interpretation of the above excerpts further explains the
GAO perception with respect to protest review authority:
While the foregoing statutes contain no authority
for GAO to adjudicate award protests; GAO has inter-
preted its duty to audit and settle public accounts as
containing an obligation to determine the legality of
contract expenditures and assure compliance with the
laws and regulations relating to expenditure of public
funds. GAO has concluded that by deciding . award pro-
tests it is preventing unauthorized payments by deter-
mining in advance, the validity of a contract that
obligates public funds. 1 [9:40]
Some dissension has, however, been raised by members of
the Executive Branch and the acquisition community. In
1971, the Attorney General of the United States expressed
the view that:
The authority to withhold awards and reject bids is
reposed by statute only in the heads of Executive
Departments or Agencies, and certain specified offices
of the military departments. [9:41]
The Congress and courts do not agree with the Attorney
General. Additionally, in 1972 the Commission on Government
Procurement (COGP) , established by public law 91-129,
Award protest, as defined by the COGP, includes protests
of awards, solicitations, and bids.
10

recommended the continuance of GAO as the award protest
reviewing authority.
In January 1979, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act was
introduced into the 96th Congress as Senate Bill S.5.
Title VII of this Bill authorizes GAO to be the overall
protest reviewing authority as specified in the Budget and
Accounting Act. [42] Passage of S.5 into public law will,
after 58 years, specifically identify the General Accounting
Office's authority in a statute.
In fact, GAO has never stopped reviewing protests since
1924. Each year since, and especially in the 1970' s, the
number of cases received has exhibited an increasing growth
rate. As an example, in 1970, 771 protests were reviewed
and 35 were sustained. In 1977, 1,6 64 were reviewed, of which
which 9 7 were sustained.
The importance of the decisions rendered by the GAO is
summarized in the following abstract:
GAO's separation from the contracting agencies assures
contractors that their complaints are considered free
from any bias toward individual agency policies and thus
promotes the confidence of both private enterprise and
the general public that Government business is conducted
with integrity. Such separation from the daily concerns
of the contracting agencies also allows GAO to frame and
solve problems in terms of the overall best interests of
the Government. The award protest decisions issued by
the Comptroller General within the past five decades form
a cogent body of Government Contract Law that is useful
for guidance in solving individual problems occurring in
contract award process and provide a basis for development
of more generally applicable procurement regulations.
GAO's establishment as an administrative forum potentially
allows it to afford a speedier solution of disputes than
would be possible if Federal Courts were the only arbiter.
[9:41]
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The protestor has three avenues which he may pursue. He
may submit directly to GAO in accordance with Title 4 of
GAO regulations as described above, or he may go directly
to the Federal Courts (a procedure implemented in 1970) . His
third recourse is to protest directly to the agency involved,
[38:407.8] No matter which of the three entry paths he uses
the ultimate result will, most likely, be a GAO decision.
This is so, because an agency decision can be appealed to
either GAO, or the courts, who almost always defer to GAO on
these matters.
The resolution of a protest which GAO reviews, will have
one of four outcomes: (1) Dismissal, usually the result of
late protest submission to GAO, is considered to be untimely;
(2) withdrawal by the protestor, is generally the result of
legal considerations; (3) a decision is rendered, but the
protest is denied because of insufficient proof of the
allegations made, or improper evidence upon which to render
a sustained decision; (4) a decision is rendered and the
protest is sustained, resulting in a GAO recommendation for
action.
The essence of this study is to analyze the last of these
categories, sustained decisions resulting from protests sub-
mitted against Department of Defense contract solicitations
or awards, for the period 1975 through 1978. The hypothesis
is that valuable lessons can be learned by such an analysis.
12

A. STATEMENT OF THE PR03LEM
At present, there is no systematic method by which indi-
vidual acquisition managers can incorporate the precedents
established by GAO protest decisions into their day-to-day
operations. Decisions can be retrieved either from the
General Accounting Office's Index of Decisions section or
from the Federal Legal Information Through Electronics
(FLITE) , a computer based information exchange service located
in Denver, Colorado. In addition, certain GAO publications
present protest decisions on a periodic basis.
For legal matters, these publications serve their purposes
very well. They do little, however, to give Acquisition
Managers the extensive overview required of the protest re-
view process. This study addresses that need.
Case material for this study is available from Federal
Legal Information through Electronics (FLITE) . All Comp-
troller General Decisions, published or unpublished, are
available. Decisions are addressable by any descriptor in
the heading, or text of the decision. Words, lines, state-
ments, or letter-number combinations are addressable.
Unfortunately, the individual Contracting Officer probably
does not have the time, nor the capability to review each
case, even if he were to limit his study to cases within his
branch of service. Too many cases must be analyzed in order
to obtain meaningful analysis data. In 1977, for example,
GAO reviewed 442 protests against DOD contracts as follows:
13

Air Force, 98; Army, 147; Navy, 114; Marine Corps, 6; Defense
Logistics Agency, 74; Others, 3.
What is needed, is an analysis of sustained GAO protests
with a view toward surfacing recurring problem areas which
might be the basis for improved contracting procedures and
responses to protests
.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The overall objective of this study is to improve the
DOD acquisition process as it relates to conditions which
have traditionally led to protests. The approach taken with
regard to this objective is: analysis of all identifiable
DOD related protest decisions sustained by the GAO, for the
years 1975 through 1978 and evaluation of conclusions drawn
from this analysis, and communication of the results to
acquisition managers in a useful format.
The following research questions will be pursued through-
out this study:
1. Can meaningful conclusions and lessons learned be
drawn from a systematic analysis of sustained GAO protest
decisions?
2. Can these conclusions and lessons learned be trans-
formed into recommendations which, when transmitted to
acquisition managers, have the potential to decrease future
protests and improve the acquisition process?
14

C. STUDY LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The GAO protest review procedures supplement those of
the Contracting Officer as outlined in DAR. As such, these
procedures are administrative in nature. Protest decisions
are rendered by attorneys in the GAO Office of the General
Counsel, and are therefore, based upon legal principles.
These decisions are considered binding upon Government
Agencies. They do not, however, bind the protestor, who
can further appeal to the courts, as the highest reviewing
authority. Court decisions are, of course, legal and binding
upon both the Government and the protestor.
The researcher's limited legal background might tend to
bias this analysis. This deficiency, however, is partially
overcome because each GAO decision analyzed contains a full
explanation of pertinent legal doctrine within the text of
the decision.
The study of Government protests is an enormous field
which this study limits to the Department of Defense, only
for the period 1975 through 1978. The field is further
reduced to only those protests reviewed and sustained by the
General Accounting Office. This study does not examine pro-
tests considered by the courts, or other agencies, which
are not sustained by GAO. Nor, does it consider protests
denied, withdrawn, or dismissed. It does, however, consider
the three major classifications of contracts; Supply, Service
and Construction.
15

Contracts emanating from the Department of Defense include
those of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, and the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) . Additionally, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) awards a small number of
DOD contracts each year.
Protests are analyzed within this study in four categories
(1) Army; (2) Air Force; (3) Navy/Marine Corps, and (4) DLA
(formerly the Defense Supply Agency—DSA) . These four cate-
gories include over 99% of all DOD protests for the year
studied. - It is assumed that the additional 1% which are not
analyzed would not significantly alter the results presented
herein.
The Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) , known as the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) prior to
8 March, 1978; Government Contract Law (GCL) ; the report of
the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) of 1972; and
the COGP Final Assessment by the General Accounting Office
(May 31, 1979) are the primary sources for policy and inter-
pretations. These publications indicate the bias of the
researcher; that of a Field Contracting Officer.
It is assumed that the reader of this study is familiar
with contracts, the acquisition process within the U. S.
Government, Contract Law, and the functions of the General
Accounting Office.
D. LITERATURE SEARCH
The literature search encompassed the Naval Postgraduate
School's Thesis, Acquisition research, and Main Libraries.
16

Within the main Library, a Defense Documentation Center (DDC)
screen was requested and conducted. The computerized data
bases of the Federal Legal Information Through Electronics
(FLITE) and the Defense Logistic Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE) were also inquiried, as was the General Accounting
Office's Index of Decisions section.
The Legal Officers' Libraries at the Naval Postgraduate
School and Fort Ord Army Base were also consulted. The most
successful inquiries for this research were DLSIE and FLITE.
In particular, FLITE provided the most significant data with
which this study was conducted.
No studies of a similar nature were encountered during
the research. Reference works providing background informa-
tion were located through DLSIE and the Postgraduate School
Thesis Library.
3asic data for analysis was most successfully provided
by FLITE. The same information is available through the GAO
Index of Decisions, but it is neither computerized, nor
addressable in the required form. Limited data is available
in Legal Libraries within Comptroller General Published
Decisions (1921-August 1977)
.
DLSIE provided Comptroller General Annual Reports to
Congress for the period 1969-1978.
The service provided by FLITE was invaluable to this
study. Without this service and the flexibility and under-
standing exhibited by the FLITE attorneys, such a study
17

would most likely have been impossible. All decisions ana-
lyzed were provided by FLITE, in the format requested by
the researcher.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I introduced the general area of study to which
this work relates. The problem statement focused upon the
compelling need for this work. The objectives were then
formulated from the above problem statement. Two research
questions were posed for the purpose of directing the analysis
toward the objectives, and ultimately, solution of the over-
all problem. Study limitations and assumptions were listed
to explain the researcher's perspective, and to give the
reader the ability to identify unintended biases contained in
the analysis. The Literature Search section explained the
procedures by which, and the means through which, information
was researched and obtained. The Organization section explains
the presentation of this study.
Chapter II, the Framework, explains in more depth, the
background and resolution of protests. Insight into the
reasons for protests, and the magnitude of the problem is
presented. Finally, the focus of this study is put into
perspective.
Chapter III identifies the research and describes the
methodology by which data was collected and analyzed. The
data is presented, and though related to the overall popula-
tion, contains some inherent problems. These problems are
examined with respect to their impact on the study.
18

Chapter IV is the Data Analysis Section. Selected cases
are grouped by protest reason. Individual representatives
of these groups are then analyzed. Additional relevant fac-
tors, not identified in the above analysis, are also presented
Chapter V answers the study's research questions and pre-
sents conclusions in the form of lessons learned, based on
the research and analysis performed.
Chapter VI summarizes the studies and makes recommenda-
tions for improvement of the acquisition and contracting pro-
cess based upon the lessons learned.
19

II. FRAMEWORK
Webster's New World Dictionary defines protest, as used
in the context of this study, in two ways; as "an objection
or remonstrance" and as "a document formally objecting to
something." [43] Both of these definitions are appropriate.
They must, however, be further limited within the contracting
environment and GAO protest procedures.
The DAR simply refers to protests as "objections to the
award of a contract." [38:2-408.8] The most comprehensive
reference comes from the Report of the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement:
Disputes occur during the process that leads to
the award of a Government contract. These disputes are
called "award protests" and may be defined as complaints
lodged by interested parties against any part of the
contract award process. Protests are usually initiated
by a company that has made an offer for a Government
contract or would like to make an offer. Typical
protests have included allegations that (1) the technical
evaluation of a proposal was not properly conducted,
(.2) the type of solicitation used was not in accordance
with statutes or regulations, (3) the low bidder was
not qualified to perform the work, or (4) the bidder who
was awarded the contract was not responsive to the terms
of the solicitation. [9:5]
It can be clearly seen from above that a protest is
administrative in nature, is not a dispute as defined by DAR,
yet, like a dispute, it can ultimately be resolved by a court
of law. None of the rules governing contract disputes apply
to the protest process. It is a remedy within the acquisition
and contracting process that is unique unto itself. Referring
again to the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement
20

Unlike disputes occurr
clause in the solicitation
to protest. Nor is such r
language. The basic execu
and procedures promulgated
Office (GAO) permit protes
contract to be lodged with
the award and with GAO. P
with U. S. district courts
ing under a contract, no
gives the offeror a right
ight found in any statutory
tive procurement regulations
by the General Accounting
ts against the award of a
the agency that solicited
rotests also may be filed
or the Court of Claims. [9:5]
The protest review system described above has been fully
explained in the introductory chapter , but is illustrated
below for clarification, as Figure 1.
DISPUTES RELATED TO AWARD OF CONTRACTS
THE PRESENT REMEDIAL SYSTEM
SEEK REVIEW OF Aoy^
FEDERAL
COURTS
Ofc VIAY S££K
p.QVjERSE £>£C
CONTRACTING
AGENCY
GAO
ENCOURAGES PROTESTOR TO
FIRST PROTEST TO AGENCY
PROTESTOR
MAY PROTEST DIRECTLY TO
COURTS, AGENCY, GAO
Source Commission Studies Program .
Figure 1.
The evidence is overwhelming that protests are being sub-
mitted at an ever-increasing rate. As previously mentioned,
from 1970 to 1977, protests received by GAO, increased from
21

771 to 1,664, a growth rate of 115%. As would be expected,
the number of sustained protests has increased over the same
period from 35 to 97, which represents a 177% growth rate.
Thus, not only are more protests being reviewed each year,
but the percent of protests sustained is increasing at an
even greater rate. It is clear then, that an effort to reduce
the numbers of protests, and particularly those sustained, is
becoming increasingly more important. The following chart
presents GAO protest figures for the 1970-1977 period.
GAO Protest Reviews 1970-1977
Decision Rendered No Decision Rendered
Sub-
Year Denied
548
Sustained
35
Total
583
Withdrawn
123
Dismissed Total
1970 65 771 [1]
1971 641 74 715 274 65 1054 [2]
1972 706 52 758 299 170 1227 [3]
1973 542 40 582 326 188 1096 [4]
1974 534 44 578 320 161 1059 [5]
1975 493 46 539 327 227 1093 [6]
1976 889 89 978 507 300 1785 [7]
1977 723 97 820 435 409 1664 [8]
The reasons underlying this tremendous growth may be more
knowledgeable contractors and fewer Defense dollars, as sugges-
ted by Major Joel LeFave in his thesis, The Procurement Protest
The following excerpts support these contentions:
Beginning in 196 8, however, aerospace activity under-
went a sharp decline. Competition for Federal resources
produced a tendency to curtail Defense expenditures.
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This curtailment of Defense expenditures is causing
a change in contractor behavior patterns. They protest
more, by-pass administrative channels, file claims for
all the extra dollars they can wring from contracts. [35]
Major LeFave continues to suggest that aversion to the
recent Governmental moves toward more risk type contracts
and possibly, poor standing of some contractors may also con-
tribute to the increasing number of protests.
To agree or disagree with the above thesis, is not the
purpose of this study. It is clear, however, that some
impetus, probably multi-faceted in nature, is driving inter-
ested parties to submit increasing numbers of protests to GAO.
It is also clear that increasing numbers of sustained protests
direct attention to either increased knowledge exhibited by
protestors, or increased inefficiencies within the conduct of
the acquisition and contracting processes. Discovering, and
ultimately correcting such inefficiencies, particularly those
of a recurring nature, is a major motivation for this research
The possibility that contractors are exhibiting greater knowl-
edge in the protest process, seems to be a positive sign, and
is not a subject which this study pursues.
Department of Defense protests form a sub set of all pro-
tests reviewed by the GAO. Other government agencies falling
under GAO cognizance, and whose acquisition and contracting
procedures are outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulations
CFAR) include the Executive Departments and other Governmental
Commissions and Administrations. The largest of these, in
terms of protest activity, are the Departments of Agriculture
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(DOA) ; Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) , Interior (DOI)
,
and Transportation (DOT) ; the General Services (GSA)
,
Veterans (VA) , and National Aeronautics and Space (NASA)
Administrations
.
These other agencies, of which there are presently 26,
account for less than 40% of GAO ' s review activity, annually.
Thus, DOD has a majority of the protest activity, and as such,
reflects in good measure, performance of the entire Govern-
ment in this field. Comparison of DOD related, as a percentage
of total protests reviewed by GAO, reveals the following:
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Annual
DOD
Protests
Reviewed 346 [1] 425 [2] 529 [3] 378 [4] 364 [5] 334 [6] 576[1] 442[8]
Percent* 59 59 69 65 63 62 59 54
*t>«~„«„+. Annual DOD Protests Reviewed . ni.^Percent = =
—
-
—
*
—
=
=,—
=
= r =; . -y by GAOTotal Annual Protests Reviewed J
(Figure 1 subtotal)
The consistency of these figures is remarkable. It can be
seen that the range is from 54 to 69% for these years, and the
median is 62%.
So, not only does DOD have the majority of Government pro-
tests, it also has very nearly the same percentage of the total,
each year. It emerges therefore, as an excellent yardstick by
which to measure all protest activity within the GAO cogni-
zance. For the above reasons, this study analyzes only DOD
protests.
24

III. METHODOLOGY
A. POPULATION DESCRIPTION
The sample for this study consisted of 2 2 DOD protests
reviewed and sustained by the General Accounting Office, from
the period 1 January 197 5 through 31 August 1978. This sample
was extracted from a population of cases provided by the
Federal Legal Information Through Electronics information
exchange for this period. Table I, below, identifies GAO
sustained protest totals, and the DOD population identified
by agency and calendar year.
TABLE I.
ALL PROTES TS
DOD
PROTESTS
TOTAL ARMY NAVY* AIR FORCE DLA TOTAL
1975 46 16 6 2 3 27
1976 89 8 8 10 5 31
1977 97 14 3 3 2 22
1978 ** 2 2 1 1 6
40 19 16 11 86
Includes both U.S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps.
**
1978 information was not available for entire
calendar year at time of this study.
Source: Developed by Reseacher.
The selection of sustained protests was made on the
premise that denied, dismissed, and withdrawn protests repre-
sent situations in which contracting actions within DOD were
25

essentially correct, therefore precluding any meaningful
analysis. Sustained decisions are always accompanied by a
GAO assessment of the Contracting Agency's procedures, and
recommendations for action. For the above reasons, it is
the researcher's belief that analysis of these decisions pro-
vides the most valuable information that can be gleaned from
the protest review process.
Table II illustrates the various protest reasons and the
quantities of the population applicable to each DOD agency,
by year.
TABLE II
REASON
CATEGORY
1. PRICING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUSTAINED PROTESTS
JAN 1975 - SEPT 1978
ARMY NAVY/MC AIR FORCE DLA TOTAL
A. NON-
RESPONSIVENESS 2
B. CONTRACTOR
ERROR
C. BID PROTEST 3
2. WAGE DETERMINA- 2
TION
3. TECHNICAL
A. RESTRICTIVE
SPECIFICATION 4
B. IMPROPER DATA
SUBMISSION BY
BIDDER 1
4. LEGAL 1
26

5. IMPROPER HANDLING
OF BIDS BY THE
GOVERNMENT AGENCY
A. INTERNAL 1 1
B. POSTAL 2 2
C
.
INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE 1 1
6. VIOLATION OF
BUY AMERICAN ACT 1 1
7 . IMPROPER EVALU-
ATION DUE TO
TECHNICAL CON-
SIDERATIONS 1 2 - - 3
8. IMPROPER APPLI-
CATION OF
REGULATIONS
A. BASIC ORDERING
AGREEMENT 1 1
. B. GSA COGNIZANCE -.11 - 2
C. IFB vs. RFP
FOR MESS
ATTENDANT SVCS 1 1
D. SOLE SOURCE
DETERMINATION 1 1
9. IMPROPER APPLICA-
TION OF EVALUATION
CRITERIA 8 6 4 2 20
10. SOLICITATION
ERRORS AND CHANGES 9 2-3 14
11. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
CRITERIA 1 1
12. REQUIRED DAR
REVISION 1 1
13. IMPROPER
NEGOTIATION - 1 - - 1
14. REQUIRED CERTIFI-
CATIONS
(SBA, ICC, etc.)
_3 _2 _- _1 6
TOTALS 40 19 16 11 86
Source: developed by Researcher

The above tables show that improper applications of evalu-
ation criteria established in solicitation documents, and
solicitation errors and changes, are the two most common
reasons that contractors protest.
Each of the categories listed in Table II are briefly
explained below:
1. Pricing - These protests key on the proposed contract
price submitted by one of the bidders.
a. Nonresponsiveness - The protestor faults the
deliberate pricing practices of another bidder, claiming his
bid to be nonresponsive
.
b. Contractor error - The protestor faults the
methods of pricing of another bidder, which are the results
of unintentional bid errors committed by the bidder in question
c. Bid protests - In these cases the contracting
agency has determined the protestor's bid to be nonresponsive
due to improper pricing.
2. Wage Rate Determinations - A protest has been sub-
mitted to GAO as a result of wage determinations established
by the Department of Labor. These wage rates have caused a
conflict in the contracting process.
3. Technical - Protests in this category are the result
of deviations in the contracting process from the normal
practices within a specific art, craft, science or profession
as identified by the protestor.
a. Restrictive specifications - The protestor is
questioning the validity and necessity of all the requirements
enumerated in the solicitation document.
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b. Improper data submission by the bidder - One or
more of the interested parties has submitted a technical
proposal which violates the specifications of the IFB.
4. Legal - Protestor has identified a violation of legal
principles in the contracting process.
5. Improper handling of bids by the Government Agency -
Protests have resulted from mishandling of bids by the con-
tracting agency, in violation of existing regulations.
a. Internal - Handling procedures within the contract-
ing agency have caused the protest.
b. Postal - Protests have identified contracting
agency policies which created postal delivery problems, causing
bids to arrive after bid openings.
c. Information disclosure - Contracting agencies have
erroneously disclosed bid information to a competing bidder,
in violation of regulations designed to preserve competition.
6. Violation of the Buy American Act - Improper applica-
tion of regulations contained in 41 U.S.C. Section 10(A) of
1970 (the Buy American Act) has generated protests.
7. Improper evaluation due to technical considerations -
This category is a combination of Category 3, Technical, and
Category 9, Improper evaluation. These protests occur when
technical problems arise in either a bid or solicitation, and
the contracting agency compounds the problem by taking no
action to eliminate these deficiencies in the bid evaluation
process
.
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8.
Improper application of regulations - This category
pertains to agency violations of existing acquisition and con-
tracting regulations, which result in protests during the
contracting process.
a. Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) - Violations of BOA
regulations occur in the contracting process as a result of
agency misapplication.
b. GSA cognizance - Certain classes of materials must
be cleared through the General Services Administration (GSA)
before they can be purchased by Government contracting agencies.
These materials are identified in the Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR)
.
c. IFB vs. RFP for mess attendant services - GAO has
identified specific guidance for mess attendant services which
is not always adhered to by contracting agencies.
d. Sole-source determination - Authorized use of
negotiation under one of the 17 DAR exceptions does
not, of itself, give a contracting officer the right to make
a sole-source determination. Protests relating to this prac-
tice have occurred.
9. Improper application of evaluation criteria - For a
variety of reasons, bid evaluations are inconsistent with the
terms, conditions and specifications in the solicitation docu-
ment, or for some other reason are unfair to one or more
bidders.
10. Solicitation errors and changes - Solicitation errors
are identified, and changes are taken exception to, which
generate protests from the aggrieved bidders.
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11. Affirmative action criteria - All bidders must comply
with the Government's criteria for affirmative action. Failure
to do so may result in a nonresponsive determination, or in
a protest from a bidder who is in compliance.
12. Required DAR revision - In some instances, current
DAR procedures may be the cause of unnecessary problems for a
bidding contractor. Protests bearing upon this situation have
occurred and when sustained by GAO, necessitate formulation
of new procedures.
13. Improper negotiation - The acquisition and contracting
regulations specify strict procedures which are to be followed
in the conduct of negotiated acquisitions. Violation of these
procedures by a contracting agency is an open invitation for
protestors.
14. Required certifications (.SBA, ICC, etc.) - Bidders on
Government contracts must possess those qualification certifi-
cates required by law and the solicitation document. Failure
of a bidder to possess such qualifications can result in a
protest by another bidder, who is certified.
Even though some qualified, none of the 8 6 cases in the
population of this study were listed in more than one reason
category. Each case was categorized by its most specific
protest reason, when it contained elements of two or more
categories. Those cases listed in general categories, 9 and
10, did not apply to any of the more specific areas.
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B. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
A sample from the population was necessary in order to
properly focus the study. One representative case was analyzed
for each category listed in Table II.
Table III shows the Agency to which, and the year in which,
each of the sample cases was directed.
TABLE III.
PROTEST REASON VS. AGENCY AND YEAR
PROTEST POPULATION AGENCY OF CALENDAR
REASON QUANTITY CASE ANALYZED* YEAR
1. A. 5 A/F 76
1. B. 4 N 78
1. C. 4 A/F 78
2. 6 A/F 76
3. A. 7 N 76
3. B. 3 N 77
4. 1 A 77
5. A. 1 D 75
5. B. 2 A 77
5. C. 1 N 76
6. 1 A 78
7. 3 N 75
8. A. 1 A 77
8. B. 2 A/F 77
8. C. 1 N 75
8. D. 1 A 75
9. 19 N 76
10. 14 N 76
11. 1 A 77
12. 1 A 75
13. 1 N 76
14. 6 N 76
*A - Army N - Navy/Marine Corps A/F - Air Force D - DLA
Source: Developed by Researcher
Table III manifests the cross-section of the sample by
agency and year. All agencies and years within the study are
represented. This cross-section is summarized in Table IV.
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TABLE IV.
SUMMARY OF SAMPLE FOR THIS RESEARCH
YEAR
AGENCY 1975
ARMY 2
NAVY/MC 2
AIR FORCE
DLA 1
YEARLY
TOTALS 5
1976
6
2
1977
4
1
1
1978
1
1
1
AGENCY
TOTALS
7
10
4
1
8 6 3 22
Source: Developed by Researcher
It is noted that the 22 categories analyzed represent more
than 25% of the population. With the exceptions of Categories
1, 2, 3, 9, 10 and 14, the analysis represents 13 of the
remaining 17 cases.
Additionally, Table IV indicates a representative sample
of all the agencies and years pertinent to this study. The
sample was selected on the basis of the most representative
case from each protest reason category. No consideration was
given to placing emphasis on the individual agencies, or years
involved
.
C. DATA COLLECTION PLAN
First, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was contacted
as a source of the desired data. The GAO Index of Decisions
maintains files for all its decisions and studies. Its person-
nel attempted to provide the needed data, but were unable to
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do so because of the incompatibility of their indexes with
the requirements of this study.
The second approach was to obtain the needed information
from publications issued by the General Accounting Office.
This included the following: (1) Decisions of the Comptroller
General of the United States, (2) Procurement Law, Quarterly
Digest of Unpublished Decisions of the Comptroller General
of the United States, (3) Decisions of the Comptroller of the
United States, Scope Line Index, and (4) The Comptroller
General's Procurement Decisions (CPD's). None of these publi-
cations proved useful for the same reason indicated above,
the incompatibility of these publications' indexes with the
requirements of this study. Each of the above publications
contains some of the required information, but are, unfortu-
nately, incomplete with respect to the total thrust of this
research effort.
The third approach was to utilize the Federal Legal
Information Through Electronics (FLITE) legal information
exchange. FLITE is an activity of the Department of Defense,
operated by the Judge Advocate General's Department, United
States Air Force.
FLITE is a computerized legal research service available
at no cost to DOD personnel and activities. For the objective
of this study, FLITE eventually provided all the data which
is contained within the population, previously identified.
Several evolutions were required, because of the programming
and data extraction methods applicable to the FLITE computer.
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Decisions of the Comptroller General must be obtained from
two listings; (1) Unpublished Decisions of the Comptroller
General, listed by B-series decision number, from 1921
through August 1978, and (2) by Comptroller General Published
Decisions identified both by B-series and Comp Gen decision
number, from 1921 through September 1977. Individual descrip-
tors can be used to obtain desired data, but knowledge of
the data bank is absolutely necessary. This is so, because
categories of decisions are not strictly maintained, and
extraction of denied, sustained, withdrawn, and dismissed
decisions within individual agencies' cognizance, requires
very careful programming. This cannot be achieved unless
researcher, FLITE lawyer, and FLITE programmer are in complete
harmony. FLITE contains valuable information for an effort
of this nature, but the researcher must learn the character-
istics of the system in order to retrieve that which he
requires
.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINED PROTESTS
A. GENERAL
An in-depth analysis was performed on the 22 cases selected
as the sample for this study. Each case represents a separate
protest reason category.
Each of the cases is analyzed in a ten-step approach. The
first six of these steps consists of identification data for
the case. Then, a summarized narrative of the case is presen-
ted, and finally, the last three steps analyze, criticize, and
indicate GAO's action recommendations. The following is an
explanation of these steps:
1. Type of protest, of which there are three. Award
protests are those which take exception to the award of a con-
tract to other than the interested party. They may be pre-
or post-award. Bid protests take exception to elimination
of the interested party from the competitive range, and claim
that the Government's determination of nonresponsiveness is
incorrect. Solicitation protests take exception to either
Invitation for Bids (IFB's) under Formally Advertised procure-
ments, or Requests for Proposals (RFP's) under Negotiated pro-
curements. All of these protests effectively block the award
of a contract, unless already made, because questions arise
regarding the protest, and must be resolved before an awardee
can be determined. Procedures for awarding in the face of a
protest, on an exception basis, do exist, however.
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It should be noted by the above definitions that the three
types of protests are mutually exclusive as utilized in this
study.
2. Method of Contracting, of which there are two. Formal
Advertising under an Invitation for Bids (IFB) is the required
procurement method, unless one of the 17 specific exceptions
listed under 10 United States Code 2304(a)(1) through (17)
applies. [38:3-210.2] When one of the exceptions applies,
Procurement by Negotiation is conducted. The solicitation
is then called a Request for Proposal (RFP) . In general,
formal advertising is used in competitive situations where
award of a firm fixed-price contract can be made. Negotiated
procurements apply, generally, to situations where the condi-
tions for formal advertising do not exist. Hence, one or
more of the 17 exceptions apply.
3. The protestor's name and his form of business are
identified.
4. The type of service to be performed, or goods to be
provided by the contractor, is indicated.
5. The specific DOD Agency issuing the solicitation docu-
ment is identified.
6. The reason for the protest, as identified in Table II
is stated. Fourteen major reason categories are identified,
four of which contain two or more sub-categories. Each sub-
category is treated as a separate and unique entity through-
out the analysis, because this study attempts to pinpoint
specific causes and remedies.
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7. A brief narrative of the case is presented.
8. Lessons to be learned from the case are formulated
and discussed.
9. Criticisms are made with reference to problems, which
either caused the protest , or aggravated the procurement
process in some other way. Consideration is given to the
systems involved, personnel errors, lack of control, and
failure of the checks and balances, from both the Governmental,
and contractor point of view.
10. The GAO Recommendation for Action is presented. Ten
unique recommendations have been identified:
a. Termination of the present contract.
b. Resolicitation of the IFB or RFP
.
c. Award to the protestor.
d. Make no alterations to the present contract—but
alter future procedures.
e. Make no alterations to the present contract—but
exercise no further options.
f. Confirm a certificate of competency.
g. Eliminate a nonresponsive bidder,
h. Consider the protestor's bid.
i. Re-evaluate best and final offers.
j. Reinstate the original solicitation document.
B. CASE ANALYSIS
Each case is keyed to a reason category, eg. la, 2, 4.
There is one case presented for each sub-category in the same
order as listed in Table II.
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1. Case la . B-186733, August 19, 1976
a. Protest of award
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Thomas Construction Company
d. Renovation of Hangar at Bangor International
Airport, Bangor, Maine
e. United States Property and Fiscal Officer, National
Guard Bureau, Department of the Army and Air Force
f. Pricing - nonresponsive (la)
g. Thomas Construction Company has protested the
consideration of bids of Coronis Construction Company and
Nickerson and O'Day, Inc., for award, contending that both bids
are nonresponsive. Coronis was requested by the procuring
activity on June 18, 1976, to extend its bid for an additional
30 days. On June 23, 1976, Coronis replied that it would
agree to the bid delay, but could not, as a result of this
delay, install the hangar doors until early in the Spring of
1977. The IFB required contract performance not later than
185 days following the date of the notice to proceed. GAO
ruled that Coronis was nonresponsive because;
It is well established that a bid which fails to meet
the delivery schedule set by an invitation must be
rejected as deviating from the material requirements
of the IFB. [16]
Thomas contended that Nickerson was nonresponsive because
of its failure to list its proposed subcontractors in the bid,
as specified in the IFB. Nickerson had placed an "X" on the
form rather than filling in the list. When contacted by the
contracting officer following bid opening, Nickerson advised
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that this deviation had been an oversight, and verbally advised
of its subcontractors, following up later in writing. The pro-
curing activity considers Nickerson's bid nonresponsive.
h. Two lessons are forthcoming from the case. First,
in the instance where a contractor is asked by the contracting
agency to extend his bid, and he replies in the affirmative,
but takes exception to the original salient terms of the
solicitation, his bid is nonresponsive. Second, in the
instance where pricing data requested in the solicitation docu-
ment has been omitted by the bidder, but is subsequently sub-
mitted after bid opening, the bid may, again, be nonresponsive.
i. Since both GAO and the contracting agency are in
agreement, it was unnecessary for Thomas to protest to GAO.
A protest to the contracting officer would have been more
appropriate and expedient.
Both Nickerson and Coronis failed to properly respond
to the IFB. Nickerson was careless, and Coronis, apparently,
did not understand the terms of the solicitation. Each of
them wasted both the Government's and their own time, by so
doing.
j . GAO recommended elimination of both nonresponsive
bidders. (Recommendation 7)
2. Case lb . B-190878, May 4, 1978
a. Award protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Ainslie Corporation
d. Provide 16 AN/BRA- 3 4 combined communications mast
antennas (6 model A, 10 model B) , spare cables and an option
for two model A's and seven model B ' s
,
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e. Washington Navy Yard, Naval Sea Systems
Command, Washington, D.C.
f. Pricing - contractor administrative mistake (lb).
g. Ainslie protested against the proposed award to
the Granite State Machine Company, maintaining that Granite
State's bid contains no prices for option quantities, and
should be deemed nonresponsive. The IFB required bid prices
for the basic requirements and the option quantities. Granite
State failed to bid on the option quantities. After bid
opening, Granite State was contacted by the contracting agency,
and replied that the option quantity prices had been erroneously
omitted. The prices which should have been submitted with the
bid were then given to the contracting agency. The Navy con-
sidered the omission as merely a clerical error, not affecting
the responsiveness of Granite State's bid. Ainslie, as previ-
ously stated, took exception to the Navy's determination.
GAO would have agreed with the Navy only if the bid as
submitted, indicated not only the possibility of error, but also
the exact nature of the error, and the amount involved. In
further clarification, GAO stated:
This exception is based on the premise that where
the consistency of the pricing pattern on the bid
establishes the error and the price, to hold that bid
nonresponsive would be to convert an obvious clerical
error of omission to a matter of nonresponsiveness . [23]
In the Granite State case, GAO felt that a reasonably
clear bidding pattern for the regular quantities existed, but
that extension of this pattern to the option quantities, was
unjustified.
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The rule applying when the above exception is not
considered valid, states:
A bid is generally considered as nonresponsive
on its face for failure to include a price on every
item as required by the IFB and may not be corrected.
[18] This rule is applicable to option items, such
as those in this case, which are to be evaluated at
time of award. [22]
GAO ruled Granite State ' s bid to be nonresponsive.
h. A bid in which prices are omitted is nonrespon-
sive, and must be rejected, except in limited circumstances
where from other prices in the bid, a consistent pattern is
discernible, which establishes evidence of error and the
intended bid. Where option quantities are unpriced, no con-
sistent pricing pattern exists, and the bid must be rejected.
i. The contractor (Granite State) was in error by
failing to properly respond to the IFB. The contracting
agency was at fault by attempting to stretch a previous GAO
decision, regarding pricing of regular items, to option items
required by the solicitation.
j. GAO determined Granite State's proposal to be non-
responsive. (Recommendation 7)
3. Case lc . B-191749, August 16, 1978
a. Bid protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Shamrock Five Construction Company
d. Air Force Contract Management Division, Kirtland
AFB, New Mexico
e. Replacement of Garage Doors on 7 00 Military
Housing Units
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f. Pricing - nonresponsive bid protest (lc.)
g. Shamrock Five Construction Company protests the
proposed rejection of its bid as nonresponsive. Nine bids
were received by the contracting agency and opened on April
11, 1978. Shamrock, having been notified just prior to bid
opening, by their supplier, of a $15,000 price reduction,
notified the contracting officer of the change, as follows:
"ITEM DESCRIPTION EST. QTY UNIT PRICE AMOUNT
0001 Install new garage doors 700EA $304.92 $213,444.00
0002 Remove garage doors 700EA $ 10.43 $ 7,301.00
Total items 0001 and 0002 %T2£~rn&T' " RVF
"
Total may be reduced to $205,745 / XX"
The President of Shamrock did not change any of the unit
prices, or extended prices in the bid, but he did initial the
new bid ("RVF"). Consequently, the above prices did not agree
with the altered price of $205,745.
The IFB provided that award should be made in the aggre-
gate. Shamrock's bid of $205,745 was the lowest bid. The con-
tracting officer, however, decided that the bid must be rejected
as nonresponsive, on the grounds that the unit price intended
was not definite, and the use of the words "may be reduced"
created doubt as to the bidder's intent. He further indicated
that payments cannot be determined, since the contractor is to
be paid the unit price multiplied by the number of units
ordered by the Government.
The second low bid was submitted by Gerald A. Martin
LTD., which bid $288.57 per unit for item 0001, and $10.00 per
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unit for item 0002, for a total price of $208,999. Thus,
Shamrock's total bid is lower than Martin's, but the original
unit prices are higher.
GAO evaluated this case on two issues; whether Sham-
rock's bid can be considered responsive to the material needs
of the IFB, and whether this bid can be evaluated on an equal
basis with all others. The following excerpt from the protest
hearing is pertinent:
Shamrock's bid imposes no conditions and is not
ambiguous or subject to doubt as to its intent to be
legally bound to perform in accordance with the IFB.
The language of Shamrock's bid reasonably can be
interpreted only as offering a total price of $205,745....
The specifications in the IFB clearly state that removal
and installation of the garage doors are not to occur,
one without the other. The specific unit price for each
door removed and installed, can be determined by dividing
700 units (estimated quantity) into the total price of
$205,745, resulting in a unit price of $293.92.
GAO further states that allocation of the $15,000 reduc-
tion between items 0001 and 0002 is immaterial, since both
actions are required in consonance with each other. As such,
evaluation of Shamrock's award can be made, equitably with the
others, on a unit price basis of $293.92 and total price of
$205,745. [19] Shamrock's bid stated that the "total may be
reduced to $205,745. 00/XX, the amount of $220,745 was crossed
out, and the change was initiated (RVF) by the bidder." In
changing the total price, Shamrock manifested the intention
to reduce the unit price of item 0001 and/or item 0002.
We have previously indicated that if a bidder
included "in the bid some reference, however worded,
to show that the amount stated as the total was know-
ingly and purposely different from the mathematical
total of the two bid items" the bid would not be ambigu-
ous. Shamrock's action meets that requirement, and
therefore is not ambiguous. [20]
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GAO goes on to say that Shamrock's intent was not
unclear. The act of crossing out the $220 , 74 5 amount, and
replacing it with $205,745, clearly showed the intent to reduce
the price by $15,000. Any other interpretation, under the
circumstances, would be unreasonable.
h. In the instance where contract award is to be made
on the basis of total price for performance of various items
in the solicitation, failure of a bidder to change unit and
extended prices, when a new total price is submitted, does
not render the bid nonresponsive. Also, since it is the pur-
pose of a Government contract to obtain acceptable goods or
services at the lowest possible price, contracting personnel
should not apply technicalities to the bid evaluation process
which inhibit this basic requirement. Overemphasis by the
contracting agency on ambiguity of unit prices, was an
unnecessary action, not conducive to the best interests of
the Government or to the maintenance of competition.
i. The contracting agency was clearly in error, by
determining Shamrock's bid to be nonresponsive. Adherence to
a strict interpretation of unambiguous unit prices, when the
award was to be made on the basis of total price, does not
follow the precepts of prudent business practices. The end
result would have been for the Government to pay a higher
price for the service, than was necessary.
j . GAO recommended that the bid of Shamrock be con-
sidered on the basis of the changed prices. (Recommendation 8)
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4. Case 2 . B-178701, July 15, 1975, 55 Comp Gen 97
a. Award protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Dyneteria Inc.
d. Provide full food services at Lowry AFB
e. Contract Management Division, Lowry AFB
f. Wage Rate Determinations (2)
g. Dyneteria protests the upward adjustment of the
contract price awarded to Tombs and Sons, Inc. of $137,214.
The Air Force made this adjustment, after award, based on
new rate determination published by the Department of Labor
(DOL) . The IFB had been issued April 30, 1974, quoting
hourly wage rates from $2.35 to $4.54 under the Service
Contract Act (SCA) wage determination 73-311 (REV. 2) . New
rates were published under Revision 3 on May 16, 1974,
increasing the range from $2.57 to $4.97. The contract was
subsequently awarded to Tombs, on August 13.
Incorporation of the new wage rates established after
bid opening but prior to award into the awarded contract, was
clearly unfair to the other bidders, and not in the Govern-
ment's best interest.
h. When a contract is awarded on the basis of old
wage rates and a new SCA wage determination has been received
after bid opening, further contract options should not be
exercised, since the proper way to determine the effect of
the new wages is to recompete. The assumption that the new
wage rates will affect all bidders equally, is fallacious.
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i. The contracting agency determination to incorpor-
ate the provision of the new wage determination, after contract
award, was in error. DAR allows two options; award under the
earlier wage rates, or resolicitation under the new wage rates.
j . GAO recommended that no further options with Tombs
be exercised, since the firm term of the contract was already
completed, and that the requirement be competitively resolicited,
utilizing the new wage rates. (Recommendations 2 and 5)
DAR provides that the contracting officer need not
incorporate into the solicitation, wage rates issued less than
10 days before bid opening, but he may, in the proper circum-
stances, resolicit utilizing new wage rates issued after bid
opening. [38 : 12-1005 . 3 (A) (II)
]
GAO ruled against the Air Force as follows:
If the collective bargaining agreement rates did not
have to be incorporated into the contract, we see no
basis for contract modification; if the CBA rates had to
be incorporated, they were available well before award
and the IFB should have been cancelled and a new IFB
issued with the CBA rates.
The rule that the contract awarded should be the
contract advertised is well established. [34] Competi-
tion is not served by assuming that the new wage rates
will affect all bidders equally It is possible that
the contract, as amended, no longer represents the most
favorable prices to the Government. Speculation as to
the effect of a change in the specifications, including
a new wage determination, is dangerous, and should be
avoided where possible. [14] The proper way to determine
such effect is to compete the procurement under the new
rates
.
5. Case 3a . B-184227, March 9, 1976
a. Solicitation protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
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c. Engineering Handling Systems and Litton Unit
Handling Systems
d. Supply of a Mechanized Materials Handling System
e. Marine Corps, Purchasing and Contracting Branch,
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
f. Technical - restrictive specifications (3a.)
g. Engineering Handling Systems (EHS) and Litton Unit
Handling Systems (LITTON) protested IFB No. M67001-B-0034
issued by the Purchasing and Contracting Branch, Camp Lejeune,
alleging that the specifications were unduly restrictive of
competition, in that they were predicated directly upon the
design criteria set forth in the descriptive literature of
Rapistan, Inc., thus giving Rapistan's authorized distributor,
Paul H. Werres Company, a competitive advantage.
The essence of the protests lies in the number, and
placement of motors within the required Material Handling
System (MHS) . The drawings incorporated within the IFB clearly
indicated 26 motor locations, 7 of which were considered
unnecessary by the protestors.
The Marine Corps, when questioned by GAO, indicated
that "it was amenable to any number of motors, so long as
operation and performance of the system was satisfactory."
A review of the solicitation did not, however, corrob-
orate the agency position. Section 2.0 entitled "General
requirements" references both the drawings and the subsequent
narrative specifications. Section 2.1 states that "the equip-
ment for the receiving system shall be in strict accordance
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with the requirements, herein specified." Section 2.2 states
that "the contractor shall accurately lay out his work
according to the drawings and be responsible for the correct
location of the equipment." In view thereof, GAO concluded
that the solicitation required the number of motors and in
the locations set out by the incorporated drawings.
GAO findings were as follows:
If we are to accept the agency's position that other
narrative sections of the specifications may be inter-
preted to leave the number and location of motors to the
contractor's discretion, then we must conclude that the
latter are at variance and in conflict with section 2.2,
resulting in an ambiguity as to that which is required.
Moreover, we would consider such ambiguity to be material
since the submissions by Litton and EHS indicate that the
number of motors and their concomitant requirements for
starters, wiring, etc., would affect the cost of the
item and presumably, bid prices.
h. Specification provisions which over-state agencies'
minimum needs and which, if agency interpretations were
accepted, would create material specification ambiguity, do
not permit full and free competition.
i. The contracting agency, admittedly, overstated its
requirements in the IFB, by utilizing design specifications
presented as a drawing. The drawing limited competition, and
was unnecessary to the solicitation. The wording within the
solicitation made the drawing specifications binding upon
bidders, and rendered agency statements that performance of
the system was the prime requirement, as inconsistent. The
agency's inconsistency, in turn, rendered the solicitation
to be ambiguous.
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j . Since neither protestor had bid on the solicita-
tion, GAO determined that neither had been prejudiced, and
that termination of the existing contract was not in the
Government's best interest. No action was taken on the
existing contract, but the defects noted herein were forwarded
to the Secretary of the Navy for elimination in future procure-
ments. (Recommendation 4)
6. Case 3b . B-187031, January 4, 1977
a. Protest of award
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Nordham Division of R. H. Siegfried, Inc.
d. Construct electronic equipment shelters
e. Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.
f. Technical - improper data submitted by bidder (3b.)
g. Nordham protested the rejection of its bid and
subsequent award to Craig Systems Corporation in relation to
IFB M00681-76-B-0049, issued on March 23, 1976, by the U. S.
Marine Corps.
The solicitation had specified that the roof, floor,
end, sides and door panels of the shelters were to be "a
lamination of foamed plastic, bonded between aluminum alloy
skins." During a pre-award survey, conducted on June 16 and
17, 1976, Nordham proposed addition of a honeycomb coring to
the foam plastic, to a member of the survey team. The team
member suggested that Nordham submit this proposal, in writing,
to the contracting officer. Nordham did so, stating that it
had decided to utilize honeycomb core and a hot bond system,
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in conjunction with foam that has been pressed into the core.
Nordham further stated that its decision was in compliance
with the solicitation's specifications.
Subsequently, the same survey team member, mentioned
above, advised the contracting officer that, "Nordham'
s
proposal can be considered as nonresponsive. " On the basis
of this advice, and the letter, the contracting officer re-
jected Nordham' s bid, which was the lowest, as nonresponsive.
He subsequently awarded to the second low bidder, Craig, on
July 6. On July 20, Nordham forwarded another letter to the
contracting officer stating that it had also advised the sur-
vey team that it was prepared to perform the contract by con-
structing the shelters, either with or without the honeycomb
core, but preferred to use it.
Craig, upon hearing of Nordham 's protest, agreed to
suspend work, as it had incurred little or no costs in per-
formance of the contract.
The Marine Corps, in responding to the protest allega-
tions, decided that Nordham' s bid was, in fact, responsive,
and that it had acted erroneously in rejecting the bid.
GAO, in amplifying the Marine Corps response, stated:
We see no basis to disagree with the Marine Corps'
present position that had it accepted Nordham' s bid as
submitted, the bidder would effectively have been bound
to perform in accordance with the advertised terms of
the solicitation, which do not provide for the use of
a honeycomb core. [24]
h. Bids should not be rejected as nonresponsive
merely because they offer an alternative approach to the
terms of the solicitation, since the Government's acceptance

of a bid as submitted effectively binds the bidder to per-
form in accordance with the advertised terms of the solicita-
tion. The alternative approach offered in no way indicates
that the bidder has misunderstood the solicitation
specifications
.
i. The contracting agency was, admittedly, in error
by rejecting the perfectly acceptable Nordham bid. Addition-
ally, the survey member was inconsistent and greatly in error
by his implications to the contractor that the honeycomb core
should be incorporated into its proposal, and his apparent
reversal in subsequently advising the contracting officer that
Nordham' s bid should be considered nonresponsive.
j. In view of the suspension of performance, and the
representation made by Craig concerning performance costs to
date, GAO recommended that the contract with Craig be termi-
nated for the convenience of the Government and the award be
made to the low bidder and protestor, Nordham. (Recommenda-
tions 1 and 3)
7. Case 4 . 3-188026, April 29, 1977
a. Award protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Sillco, Inc.
d. Packing, Crating and Drayage services
e. U. S. Army Field Artillery Center (USAFAC) , Fort
Sill, Oklahoma
f. Legal - I.C.C. licensing arrangements (4)
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g. Sillco protested any award to Chevalley Moving
and Storage of Lawton, Oklahoma, because Chevalley was not
licensed in its own name by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(I.C.C.) to perform services specified in the solicitation.
The contracting agency had determined Chevalley to be
the low bidder, and that the IFB did not require a bidder to
possess ICC operating authority in its own name. Since
Chevalley of Lawton had an agency agreement to move household
goods under its parent company's license, the contracting
officer determined it to be a responsive bidder under the
terms of the IFB.
GAO, as a general rule, does not review responsibility
determinations unless fraud is shown on the part of procuring
officials, or the solicitation contains definitive responsi-
bility criteria, which have not been applied. [28] A specific
requirement for a federal license is such a definitive respon-
sibility criterion, and compliance therewith is a matter
reviewable by GAO.
In a previous decision, GAO had held:
Where an invitation requires a bidder to have ICC
operating authority, but does not specifically require
the bidder to possess such authority in its ov/n name,
the bidder need not possess such authority in its own
name to be eligible for contract award. [17]
As such, the contracting officer's decision was correct
and consistent with the previous GAO determination.
However, subsequent to the contracting officer's determi-
nation, the ICC has held in its recent Bud's Moving and
Storage, Inc. decision:
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The performance of incidental transportation in
connection with pack and crate service by a local
uncertified agent 'using' its Van Line principal's
authority to be a clear violation of the law. We
interpret the Interstate Commerce Act as requiring
a contractor on a Government container ization contract,
actually performing the transportation service, to hold
in its own name either section 206 or 209 operating
authority as a motor common or contract carrier. An
uncertified agent may not 'use' or 'lease' the oper-
ating authority of its principal to perform the Drayage
service. In so deciding, we make no distinction between
an agent simply listing its principal's ICC motor carrier
operating number in the bid and elaborate subcontracting
lease-back arrangement employed by petitioner. [41]
GAO, having taken into consideration the above decision,
presented its views as follows:
Since Chevalley of Lawton, a separate and distinct
legal entity, has an agency agreement with the parent
Chevalley firm and it was on this basis that the con-
tracting officer determined Chevalley of Lawton to be
responsible, the Bud's decision would appear to be
applicable here. On the other hand, the ICC in Bud's
was not concerned with parent/subsidiary corporate
relationships; it was faced with a solicitation where
a local carrier was an agent for and subcontracted work
to a major Van Line authorized to operate as a motor
carrier throughout most of the country. It may be,
therefore, that the ICC would view the Chevalley arrange-
ment as a permissible one. However, there is nothing in
the record to indicate that this aspect of the situation
has been considered by the contracting officer or that
Chevalley has undertaken to ascertain an ICC position
on the matter.
h. In light of the recent ICC Bud decision, no one
is in error, or to be blamed for the situation herein sub-
scribed. It does, however, behoove the agent contractor,
Chevalley of Lawton, and the contracting officer to determine
the exact interpretation of the Bud's decision as it applies
in this case.
i. Not applicable
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j . GAO recommended that the contracting agency
reconsider the responsibility determination, taking into
account the holding in the Bud 's decision, and whether or
not this decision applies to the Chevalley corporate arrange-
ment. (Recommendation 6)
8. Case 5a . B-183438, June 2, 1975, 54 Comp Gen 999
a. Bid protest
b. Invitation for Bids (FB)
c. Hydro Fitting Manufacturing Corporation
d. Supply of Federal Stock Classification 4370 material
e. Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC)
,
Columbus, Ohio
f. Improper handling of bids by the Government -
Internal (5a.)
g. Hydro Fitting Manufacturing Corporation protests
the rejection of its bid on IFB No. DSA700-75-B-1579 issued
by DCSC on February 5, 197 5.
At 4:45 P.M. on February 28, 1975, Hydro transmitted
a telegraphic bid to DCSC. The telegram was acknowledged by
the DCSC automatic "reply back" system. This acknowledgement
appears at the beginning (proper hook-up) and end (receipt)
of Hydro's copy of the telegram. Additionally, on March 6,
1975, Hydro mailed a copy of the February 28 telex to DCSC.
This copy was received by DCSC on 10 March, and was confirmed
as the purported Hydro telex.
Bid opening, however had occurred at 10:30 A.M. on
5 March; seven bids had been received and opened, but Hydro's
was not among them.
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Upon learning that its telegraphic bid had not been
considered, Hydro inquiried DCSC as to the reason. The agency's
investigation revealed that the digital branch had no record
of the telegraphic bid, but that the telex machine had been
out of order from 3:30 P.M. until midnight on February 28.
This occurred because the machine ran out of paper, and the
tape had jammed, but acknowledgement of incoming messages
continued.
DCSC did not dispute Hydro's contentions, but refused
to consider its bid anyway, quoting previous GAO decisions,
and DAR, as authority. The previous GAO decisions had conclu-
ded that receipts for certified mail purported to have contained
bids, but which were never opened, were not ample evidence to
allow resubmission of bids after bid opening. [11] DAR states
that:
Any bid received at the office designated in the
solicitation after the exact time specified for receipt
will not be considered unless it is received before
award is made, and it was sent by mail (or telegram if
authorized) and it is determined by the Government
after receipt at the Government installation.
The only acceptable evidence to establish the time
of receipt at the Government installation is the time/
date stamp of such installation on the bid wrapper or
other documentary evidence of receipt maintained by the
installation.
DCSC has stated that:
Since receipt of the telegraphic bid in question
cannot be established by the time/date stamp or other
documentary evidence maintained at this center, the
telegraphic bid does not qualify for consideration
under clause C39 (of the IFB, which merely restates
the DAR clauses, above).
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GAO, in disagreeing with the agency, took the position
that while clear evidence of time of receipt is nonexistent
in this case, evidence of Government mishandling which would
permit acceptance of a late bid is overwhelming. Hydro had
produced an acknowledged copy of its telegraphic bid, with
time of transmission at the bottom of the message, thus sub-
stantiating time and date of receipt. Moreover, the authen-
ticity question is substantiated by the fact that the con-
firming copy was mailed prior to the time that Hydro could
have known of the telex malfunction. The only possible con-
clusion, given these circumstances, was that the bid was not
timely considered for award purposes, due solely to Govern-
ment mishandling within the spirit and intent of the late bid
regulation. No bidder, including Hydro, was competitively
prejudiced by this decision.
h. Overly strict interpretation of regulations for
the purpose of covering up internal agency errors does not
serve the public interest. Such practices in the contracting
community are potentially destructive of projected good will,
the maintenance of fair competition, and the integrity of the
contracting mechanism.
i. The contracting agency clearly mishandled Hydro's
bid. More importantly, it refused to admit this error by
emphasizing an unfair interpretation of the regulations, in
the strictest sense. The best interests of the Government and
the competitive system are not well served by such narrow
interpretations
.
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j. GAO recommended that Hydro's bid should be con-
sidered for award. (Recommendation 8)
9. Case 5b . B-188665, June 22, 1977, 56 Com Gen 737
a. Bid protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Federal Contracting Corporation
d. Provide Medical Supplies
e. Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center (FAMC)
f. Improper handling of bids by the Government -
Postal (5b.)
g. Federal Contracting Corporation protested the re-
jection of its bid, as untimely, by FAMC under IFB DADA03-77-
B-0488, issued February 18, 1977.
Federal's bid was received by the Aurora, Colorado
Post Office at 5 P.M. on Saturday, March 19, 1977, annotated,
"special delivery" and "certified mail." It was not delivered
to the FAMC Post Office until 10 A.M. on 21 March (Monday)
.
It was held for delivery until 2:30 P.M., at which time the
Army Postal personnel picked it up for delivery to FAMC. It
was subsequently receipted for, by hand, at 2:40 P.M., and
delivered to the Procuring Contracting Officer at 2:50 P.M.
3ids had been opened at 2 P.M., and Federal's bid was
determined to be untimely, per timely bid procedures specified
in DAR.
Federal contended that FAMC prevented timely delivery
of its bid by refusing to accept special delivery mail on the
weekends.
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GAO determined Federal's contention to be true, and a
previous GAO determination applies to this case:
We held that a bid should be considered for award
where the post office attempted delivery of an Air-Mail
special delivery bid on Sunday, the day before bid opening,
and instructions at the Government installation precluded
guards from accepting mail so that the post office had to
redeliver the bid the next day and failed to do so until
after bid opening. This decision is controlling here.
[10]
In applying the above precedent to this case, GAO continues:
We note particularly that P & C personnel placed
passive reliance on the postal service to timely deliver
bids for a Monday bid opening after a weekend when
delivery of such mail was made impossible by FAMC and
when the normal course of delivery might well be expected
to be delayed due to mail buildup over the weekend. In
these circumstances, we think that FAMC personnel were,
at the least, obligated to make timely inquiry of the
USPS regarding the possibility of additional bids. No
such action was taken. We consider the agency's conduct
in these circumstances to fall short of the standard
required for the effective establishment of and imple-
mentation of procedures for the receipt of bids and
regard such failure as the paramount cause of delay.
h. In instances where an agency's policy is not to
accept special delivery mail on the weekends, and bid openings
are scheduled early in the week, particularly on Monday, it is
unacceptable for the contracting personnel to place passive
reliance upon routine mail deliveries, to insure timely receipt
of bids. Mail buildup during weekends is a very common occur-
rence, and special care must be taken to insure that late bids
are not the result of carelessly executed procedures in the
contracting agency.
i. The policy of FAMC, not to accept special delivery
mail on the weekends, was questionable, and had a very negative
effect on the flow of mailed bids to P & C early in the work
week.
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Given the FAMC policy, however, it was incumbent upon
the contracting officer to circumvent the normal mail flow,
in order to prevent the late bids. It is apparent from the
narrative that no thought was given to requesting a change in
the FAMC mail policy, or to implementing a special policy
just for P & C. This lack of planning and implementation by
the contracting officer reflects very negatively upon his
judgement
.
j. GAO strongly urged a change in FAMC ' s P & C mail
pick up procedures. Their recommendation which impacted on
the case at hand, was that Federal's bid should be considered
for the award. (Recommendation 8)
10. Case 5c . B-185715, May 4, 1976, 55 Comp Gen 1066
a. Protest of award
b. Request for Proposals (RFP)
c. T M Systems, Inc. (TM)
d. Supply of measuring instruments
e. Navy Regional Contracting Office (NRCO)
,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
f. Improper handling of bids - disclosure of
information (5c.)
g. T M Systems, Inc. (TM) protested against the pro-
posed award of a contract to Vogue Instrument Corporation
(Vogue), under RFP N00140-76-R-0503 , issued by NRCO, Phila-
delphia, TM contended that in conjunction with a previous
release of information of its bid price, the Navy had failed
to inform TM that Vogue had alleged a pricing mistake in its
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initial proposal, and had requested that its initial proposal
price be corrected downward, to an amount lower than TM's
initial price. The essence of TM's protest was that Vogue
had been given a competitive advantage, as a result of the
contracting agency's error.
On December 10, 1975, both TM and Vogue submitted
proposals, priced as follows: TM. . .
.
$19 8 , 000 . 00; Vogue....
$212,832.70. Price was the determining factor in this acqui-
sition, and both offers were considered acceptable. On
December 11, 1975, the contracting officer erroneously released
TM's unit and total prices to Vogue.
Shortly after this occurrence, Vogue alleged to have
made a pricing mistake in its proposal, and requested that its
proposal price be corrected to an amount lower than TM's
initial price. Vogue further alleged that the pricing mistake
was completely unrelated to the disclosure of TM's price.
The contracting officer realized that he had a serious
problem, and he opted for making a full disclosure of the
prices submitted by both offerors in their initial proposals
to both parties, in order to overcome the competitive advantage
which he had given to Vogue.
On December 31, 197 5, TM and Vogue were informed of
the Navy's intention to solicit best and final offers. Both
TM's and Vogue's unit and total prices were released with this
announcement. Each of them responded to the request. 3oth
proposals were approximately 10% lower than the previous low
bid, and Vogue's bid was the lowest. TM subsequently filed
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its protest to GAO on January 14, 197 6, and in the U. S.
District Court, seeking a temporary restraining order on
April 5, 1976.
GAO pointed out that even though the release of TM's
prices was in error, it was unintentional. Additionally, it
was ruled that the contracting officer's decision to proceed
as he did, was essentially correct, even though certain
aspects of an "auction" type technique are contained within
this procedure.
GAO, in emphasizing the essence of this protest,
states, as follows:
As indicated previously, where best and final offers
are sought in a case of this kind, the contracting agency
must attempt to equalize the competition and eliminate
insofar as possible any offeror's unfair competitive
advantage. We believe the Navy's failure to advise TM
of Vogue's mistake in proposal claim did place TM in a
less than equal competitive position. This conclusion
does not depend on Vogue's motivation for alleging a
pricing mistake in its proposal, whether the mistake
could be substantiated, or whether the allegation of
mistake should have been rejected as a late modification
to Vogue's initial proposal. The salient fact is simply
that Vogue indicated its willingness to accept an award
at a price below its initial proposal price and TM's
initial proposal price, and that TM, in preparing its
best and final offer, was unaware of this fact. We
believe this is a sufficient degree of inequality in the
competition to warrant corrective action.
h. Where information in the initial proposal has been
improperly disclosed, and award cannot be made on the basis
of initial proposals (in this case, because initial proposals
were not considered to be fair and reasonable— the Govern-
mental estimate was $134,000), conduct of negotiations, and
submission of best and final offers should be undertaken in
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such manner to reinstitute equally competitive positions for
both offerors.
i. The contracting officer was initially at fault by
his disclosure of TM's prices. His attempts to overcome this
mistake were considered to be correct, with the exception that
the bid price change of Vogue should have been relayed to TM
in order that Vogue would not be given an unfair advantage.
j. GAO recommended that the Navy obtain permission
from Vogue to release the mistake in its proposal claim, and
to make it a condition of Vogue's continued participation in
the acquisition. If Vogue refused, then the award should be
made to TM. (Recommendation 3) If Vogue agreed, then the
Navy should release the information to TM, and after a reason-
able time, obtain another round of best and final offers, and
proceed with the award. (Recommendation 9)
11. Case 6 . B-184672, August 23, 1976
a. Protest of award
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Davis Walker Corporation
d. Supply of steel wire under NSN 9505-00-596-9648
e. Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) , Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania.
f. Violation of the Buy American Act. (6)
g. Davis Walker Corporation (Davis) has protested
the award of a contract to the R. H. Pines Corporation, under
IFB DSA500-75B-2427, issued by DISC, on the grounds that the
steel wire offered by Pines should have been evaluated as a
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foreign source end product under the Buy American Act, 41
U.S.C. 10A-D (1970).
R. H. Pines Corporation represented itself to the con-
tracting agency as a regular dealer, and indicated that the
supplies which it offered would be manufactured by the Titan
Steel and Wire Co. (TITAN) , of British Columbia, Canada.
Canadian end products are evaluated on an equal basis with
U.S. end products. DAR states that:
"Canadian end products" means an unmanufactured end
product mined or produced in Canada, or an end product
manufactured in Canada if the cost of its components
which are mined, produced, or manufactured in Canada or
the United States exceeds 50 percent of the cost of all
its components. The cost of components shall include
transportation costs to the place of incorporation into
the end product. [38 : 6-103 . 5 (A)
]
Davis contended that galvanized wire is a manufactured
product, and that the basic components of such wire are steel
rod and zinc coating, regardless of the procedures used in
producing the end product. As such, the end product from Titan
should have been considered as containing more than 50 percent
foreign made components, and the differential specified in the
Buy American Act should have been applied to Pine's bid.
Pines, in reply to the protest, indicated that the main
component of the galvanized end-product wire is bright wire,
which is manufactured in Canada (from Japanese steel) . Pines
claims that the manufacture of bright wire changes the charac-
teristics of the steel rod, thus indicating that all the compo-
nents of the galvanized wire, which is made up of wire and
zinc, are either mined or produced in Canada.
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The contracting officer agreed that bright wire was
the basic component, and awarded the contract to Pines on
July 26, 1975.
GAO in reviewing this case, noted that DAR guidance
is not clear with respect to this dispute:
Whether the manufacture of the galvanized wire from
the steel rods is traditionally performed in one or two
stages is in dispute. If the manufacture of the wire
is traditionally performed in one continuous stage, as
Walker contends, then the source of the steel rod must
be considered to determine whether the end product should
have been evaluated as foreign under the Buy American
Act, 41 U.S.C. 10A-D (1970).
In the present situation we cannot say that the
contracting officer's conclusion was incorrect. How-
ever, we believe this case illustrates the need for
guidance in defining the term "manufacture" as used in
the Buy American Act so that procuring agencies will be
able to insure that only domestic source end products
are acquired for public use.
h. Determination of whether or not to apply the Buy
American Act requires clarification in the case where foreign
made components are processed through more than one manufac-
turing stage. More precise guidance from the Acquisition
and Contracting regulations is required with respect to this
subject,
i. The only fault to be identified herein lies
within the meaning of the term "manufacture" as specified in
the DAR. More precise guidance must be given with respect to
the definition of this term, so that consistent determinations
in the use of the Buy American Act can be made.
j . GAO recommended that the applicable Governmental
acquisition regulations (FPR and DAR) be more precisely de-
fined with respect to the term "manufacture," as used in the
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context of the Buy American Act. No exception was taken with
respect to the award. (Recommendation 4)
12. Case 7 . B-183275, November 4, 1975
a. Solicitation protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c
.
Acurex Corporation
d. Supply of torsionmeters and associated repair parts
e. Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
f. Improper evaluation due to technical considerations (7
g. Acurex Corporation protested against the Invitation
for Bids N00024-75-B-4254 , issued by the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) on December 20, 197 4, as a small business
set-aside. Acurex contends that the IFB unduly restricts com-
petition, because the method of stress measurement defined in
the IFB is unnecessary to the requirements of the solicitation.
Acurex manufactures a torsionmeter which measures
stress by the use of an electronic sensor fitted between two
collars on a rotating propeller shaft. The IFB calls for
magnetostriction measuring technique which involves measuring
changes which may occur in the magnetic properties of the
shaft as it rotates. Both types of instrument perform essen-
tially the same function.
The Navy desires the magnetostrictive equipment
because it claims that the Acurex torsionmeter does not pro-
vide for the required safety factors. In a study conducted
by both the Navy and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
each determined that the knife edge blades of the Acurex
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design, themselves, stressed the shafts beyond acceptable
levels. This study was based upon a clamping pressure of
16,000 PSI.
Acurex stated that the clamping pressure of 16,000
PSI was not to be utilized on all classes of ships, and took
exception therefore, to the results of the study. The Navy
av/arded the contract to Mechanical Technology Incorporated
(MTI) on August 6, 1975.
GAO did not rule on the matter of whether or not the
specifications reflect the minimum needs of the service, as
this determination can only be made by the procuring agency.
[27]
GAO did, however, determine that the Navy foreclosed
Acurex' bid en the basis of an erroneous assumption (use of
16,000 PSI clamping pressure), and that the procurement may
have been unduly restrictive of competition.
h. Where the protestor claims unduly restrictive
specifications, which are based upon a study limited by
erroneous assumptions, further review of these specifications
and resolicitation, in light of a determination that they are,
in fact, unduly restrictive, is required.
i. The contracting agency, in accepting a study
based upon an erroneous assumption, is at fault in this case.
j . GAO recommended that further testing of the
Acurex design be completed. In the case where the safety
factors in the IFB were validated, the award to MTI would not
have been disturbed.
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If, however, further study resulted in a finding of
unduly restrictive specifications in the existing IFB, the
present contract would have to be cancelled and resolicited.
(Recommendations 1 and 2)
13. Case 8a . B-187968, September 28, 1977, 56 Com Gen 1005
a. Protest of award
b. Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA)
c. D. Moody and Company, Inc.
d. Supply of Aviation parts
e. U. S. Army Aviation Systems Command
f. Improper application of regulations - BOA (8a)
g. D. Moody and Co. (Moody) protested the acquisition
policies and procedures employed by the United States Army
Aviation Systems Command, in placing delivery order No. 3285
under Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) DAAJ01-71-A-0 303 with
Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corp.
Moody contended that it had been wrongfully excluded from the
competition in two ways: (1) Award before publication in
the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) precluded Moody from sub-
mitting a bid, and (2) sole-source acquisition under the BOA
avoided competition from surplus dealers. Moody contended
its surplus parts to be new, unused, and non-deteriorable
parts manufactured by Sikorsky, and carrying the same part
number as those ordered under the BOA.
The Army expressed concern that parts from a surplus
dealer would not be acceptable, and cited DAR as the authority
for excluding Moody from the competition.
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The negotiation authority for the sole-source procure-
ment was Title 10 U.s.C. (10) which permits negotiation "for
property or services for which it is impracticable to obtain
competition. [38 :3-210. 2 (A) (10)
]
The determination and finding supporting the negotia-
tion authority stated that the spare parts could only be
identified by manufacturer's part number, since design data
available was incomplete to permit advertised bidding.
GAO viewed this determination as unmeritorious. Since
the parts in question were required under MIL-STD-1008, it was
not possible that Sikorsky part numbers, offered by Moody,
would be in variance with part numbers offered by Sikorsky.
The real issue which the Army was attempting to address
was their concern over quality control. GAO shared this con-
cern, as the following excerpt indicates:
The Army's real concern appears to be over accepting
surplus property without being capable of inspecting the
parts so as to insure quality and conformance. The case
at hand is somewhat unique. Here, Moody can offer a new,
unused, nondeteriorable part from Sikorsky, identified by
the same part number. While the Army has a legitimate
concern relative to what, where, when, why, and how an
item became surplus, such concern without more, is
not sufficient to preclude procurement of surplus parts
from surplus dealers. With regard to the effect which
limited data rights bear on inspection, Sikorsky is
required by the BOA to establish and maintain a quality
control program to assure adequate quality throughout
all stages of manufacture. Sikorsky is also required to
maintain records of all inspection work. The Navy has
the responsibility to assure that Sikorsky's quality
control program meets the requirements. The Navy's
inspection, in accordance with NAVAIR Field Administra-
tion manual 4330.16, includes spot checking the product,
auditing inspection records and visual checking of the
manufacturing process. The Navy does not inspect an
item after delivery from Sikorsky, although a limited
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visual inspection is made by field maintenance personnel
prior to installation. Accordingly, the only distinction
between surplus parts from Moody's shelves, as opposed to
Sikorsky's, is the necessity to update the historical
data on the item since it left Sikorsky's plant. Once
this data has been supplied, there is no distinction.
Here, the part Moody would offer was purchased from the
Government as surplus. Therefore, the part has passed
all the inspection procedures the Army alleges must be
performed prior to acceptance of the item.
Therefore, surplus dealers cannot be automatically
eliminated by simply opting for a sole-source determination
under exception 10. But, the question of whether or not
use of the BOA is acceptable in this case is an entirely
different matter which GAO clarified:
Based on the information the Army had at the time
the order was placed, the determination that it was
impracticable to obtain competition was reasonable.
It would be overly burdensome on the procurement system
to require the procurement activity to ascertain in
every instance the existence of a surplus dealer
(assuming surplus parts were acceptable) before using
a BOA. Such a procedure would contravene the very
purpose of the BOA. [38 :3-410 . 2B]
And, finally, addressing the issue of the late BOA
synopsis in the CBD , GAO references the provisions of DAR,
as follows:
(c) Limitations
(1) Basic ordering agreements shall not in any manner
provide for or imply any agreement on the part of the
Government to place future orders or contracts with the
contractor involved, nor shall they be used in any manner
to restrict competition. [38:3-410(0(1)]
Timely synopsis is required so as to allow potential
bidders an opportunity to compete. The publishing of a
fait accompli does not allow alternate sources to bring
their existence to the attention of the Government.
[38:1003.2]
h. Three lessons learned were established from this
case: (1) BOA's cannot be used to exclude surplus spare
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parts dealers, once the contracting agency has been made
aware of the potential source of supply, especially when
surplus parts are acceptable from the item manufacturer.
(2) While the Government may not have adequate data rights
in parts to obtain competition from other manufacturers,
the part number is sufficient, of itself, to acquire the
part from either the manufacturer or surplus parts dealers.
(3) Publication of a synopsis in the Commerce Business Daily
must precede ordering under BOA procedures, so as to allow
potential bidders an opportunity to compete.
i. The Army contracting agency v/as in error through
its late synopsis of the associated BOA in the CBD, thus
restricting competition. Additionally, the sole-source
determination was unfounded, and based upon erroneous assump-
tions, which have been identified in the narrative. This
mistake would not have been committed if a proper synopsis
had appeared in the CBD prior to placing the order, because
any potential bidders would have been identified, and use of
the BOA would have been prohibited.
j. GAO recommended that in the future, the BOA syn-
opsis should be published in the CBD in timely fashion, but
in this case, since the orders under question had been substan-
tially completed, the order should not be disturbed.
CRecommendation 4)
14. Case 8b . B-186501, February 2, 1977
a. Award protest
b. Request for Proposals (RFP)
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c. Control Data Corporation
d. Supply of Disc Packs for a Univac U-1050-II
Computer System
e. Warner Robbins AFB , Georgia
f. Improper application of regulations - GSA cogni-
zance (8b)
g. Control Data Corporation (CDC) protested the award
of a contract to Sperry Rand Corporation, under RFP F09603-
76-D-4413, issued by the Contract Division at Warner Robbins
AFB. The award was made on March 25, 1976. Under the terms
of the contract, an initial order for the purchase of 290
disc packs, at a total price of $221,560, was issued. The
exercise of further options could increase the quantity to
575.
CDC protested on three grounds: CI) Violation of
Federal Property Management Regulations (FPMR) , by not obtain-
ing GSA delegation of procurement authority (DPA)
,
(2) the
Air Force determination to negotiate on a sole-source basis
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304(A) (10) was not well founded, and
(3) an earlier amendment of a Univac contract which the Air
Force relied upon in part to support the sole-source deter-
mination was not justified and was improper.
GAO concluded that since the procurement had not been
authorized by GSA, and a DPA was not issued, the other con-
tentions need not be considered.
Essentially, the protest centers on the issue whether
disc packs are ADP equipments (ADPE) , or supplies.
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The following excerpt from FPMR is very apt:
Restriction on sole-source procurements
Sole-source procurement of ADPE in excess of $50,000
over the system's life by either lease or purchase is
permitted only after delegation of procurement authority
(DPA) is provided by GSA. Where a sole-source procure-
ment appears to be in the best interest of the Govern-
ment, agencies shall submit to GSA a request for a DPA
accompanied by a statement or determination and finding
justifying the requested action. [32:101-32.403.5]
The Air Force claims that disc packs are supplies, and
cites AFM 300-6 and DOD Directive 5100.40 as the authority for
this claim. They further state that disc packs are storage
media not unlike computer tape and punched cards, which are
also supplies.
However, FPMR states:
Supplies means consumable items designed specifically
for use with ADPE, such as computer tape, ribbons, punch
cards, and tabulating paper. [32:101-32.402.4]
GSA comments that disc packs differ from computer
tape in the method of transport, which results in minimal
wear when compared to computer tape. Additionally, industry
practice is to lease disc packs and to sell computer tape,
giving further credence to the premise that disc packs are
ADPE. Further, discs are classified under FSC 7025, ADP I/O
and storage devices, while magnetic tape is listed under FSC
704 5, ADP supplies and support equipment.
In a previous decision, GAO had ruled that disc packs
were considered by FPMR to be ADPE. [31] In support of GSA
and FPMR, GAO, in this case, ruled that the Air Force decision
was improper:
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Having regard for the fact that disc packs are not
"consumable items" as required by the FPMR definition
for supplies, that it has been our previous understanding
that disc packs are ADPE; and that the view of GSA,
which is entitled to significant weight because of its
statutory responsibility and authority for Government
ADPE procurement, is that the disc packs are ADPE; we
conclude that the Air Force was without authority to
proceed with the award without a DPA. Although the DOD
directive and AFM support the contracting officer's
action, the FPMR, which is binding on all Federal
agencies, takes precedence in the matter. [29]
h. Disc packs for use with a computer system are not
to be considered as consumable items, but are ADPE, and can-
not be acquired on a sole-source basis without delegation of
authority from GSA.
i. The Air Force procuring agency was in error by
attempting to justify an action by quoting an Air Force Manual
and a DOD directive as authority, in the face of conflicting,
superceding regulations and interpretations issued at a higher
level, and supported by GSA and GAO. It seems apparent that
the Air Force was operating in questionable fashion, by their
disregard for GAO and GSA's positions, and the Federal regu-
lations clear definition of disc packs as ADPE.
j. Since the initial order had already been completed,
GAO recommended that no further orders be placed under the
contract. (Recommendation 5)
15. Case 8c . B-181663, March 28, 1975, 54 Comp Gen 809
a. Protest of award
b. Request for Proposals (RFP)
c. Ira Gelber Food Services, Inc.
d. Mess attendant services at NAS Key West, Florida
e. Naval Supply Center, Charleston, S. C.
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f. Improper application of regulations - Enlisted
Dining Facilities - use of IFB vs. RFP (8c)
g. Ira Gelber Food Services, Inc. (Gelber) protested
against the award of a mess attendant services contract to
Military Base Management of New Jersey (MBM) , under RFP
N00612-74-R-0175, issued on April 24, 1975 by NSC, Charleston
The essence of the Gelber protest was to question the
negotiation procedure and procurement method utilized by the
Navy. Gelber noted that the Navy had not complied with a
previous GAO decision that:
The Navy should consider formally advertising all
future procurements for mess attendant services (as do
the Army and the Air Force) . [26]
The existing contract was negotiated under 10 U.S.C.
section 2304(a)(1). As a total small business set-aside, it
gave the Navy the option of using conventional negotiating
techniques, or small business restricted advertising, which
is essentially an IFB, limited to small business.
The Navy attempted to justify use of the RFP by
indicating their lack of confidence in the manhour require-
ments estimated by Food Service Officers.
Subsequent to the above attempted justification, the
Navy reversed its decision, stating that inequitable appli-
cation by various contracting officers, of the RFP evaluation
factors, was key in their reversal. Twenty protests had been
submitted on 29 negotiated procurements, by 13 different
offerors, in Fiscal Year 1974.
The Navy goes on to say:
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Based on our experience with formal advertising this
year, and the major problem areas noted above with the
negotiation method, it has been determined that procure-
ment of mess attendant services by formal advertising is
the method that will result in a more uniform treatment
of bidders, in addition to encouraging more realistic
competition. Accordingly, all solicitations for these
services issued after March 15, 1975, will be formally
advertised.
GAO commended the Navy on its change of position,
and agreed, in total, with the Navy's new assessment.
h. Total small business set-asides for mess attendant
services, pursuant to Exception (1) of the 17 negotiation
exceptions listed in the DAR, should be conducted by the
process known as small business restricted advertising, since
the Navy had failed to show any benefit by being the only
service continuing to use negotiation procedures.
i. The contracting agency was in error by refusing
to use restricted advertising in lieu of RFP ' s , in connection
with small business set-asides for mess attendant services.
In addition, better man-hour projections by Food Service
Officers would greatly improve the contracting mechanism by
giving contracting personnel better yardsticks with which to
measure contractor's offers.
j . GAO recommended that no option be exercised on the
present contract with MBM. (Recommendation 5)
16. Case 8d . B-183683, October 9, 1975
a. Protest of award
b. Request for Proposals (RFP)
c. Non-Linear Systems, Inc. and Data Precision
Corporation
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d. Supply of multimeters
e. U. S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala.
f. Improper application of regulations - sole-source
determination (8d)
g. Non-Linear Systems Incorporated (N-L) and Data
Precision Corporation (DP) protested the proposed award of a
contract to the John Fluke Manufacturing Co. (FLUKE) , for 149
multimeters, under RFP DAAH01-75-R-0746 , issued by the U. S.
Army Missile Command (MICOM) , April 4, 1975. The award was
to be made under the "Public exigency" negotiation Exception
(2) , as the requirement was assigned a priority designator
of 02.
In the April 4 edition of the Commerce Business
Daily (CBD) , the RFP was announced with the due date of
May 1, 1975. Shortly thereafter, Data Precision began its
attempts to obtain a copy of the RFP. DP tried unsuccess-
fully throughout April to get a copy of the RFP, finally
receiving one on May 1, 197 5. Fluke responded to the
solicitation on April 9, and submitted its formal proposal
on April 23. On April 18, Non-Linear Systems protested the
sole-source solicitation to GAO; on April 30, Data Precision
took similar action.
MICOM sought to justify the negotiated sole-source
solicitation on grounds that the material was urgently needed;
that Fluke could provide an established quality product with
which the Army was familiar; that there were no performance
specifications required by the multimeter, and no drawings
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describing the design of the instrument; that the only
description available was a Fluke part number; and that
technical data was not available nor forthcoming for use
by other manufacturers.
As to DP's unsuccessful attempts to obtain an RFP,
MICOM offered no explanation for its refusal to issue one,
but noted that DP was not prejudiced by this action.
GAO, while agreeing that a sole-source justification
was reasonable, commented that continued restriction of the
acquisition was neither necessary nor valid. The basis for
this decision was evidence submitted by the protestors, in
the following:
The protestors have submitted evidence to the effect
that the Army's requirement is for, and Fluke's item is,
a standard off-the-shelf digital multimeter; that 20 or
more firms produce off-the-shelf multimeters which will
meet or exceed the performance parameters noted above;
that there is no need for any technical documentation
other than a listing of the salient characteristics of
the Fluke model 8000A-01, which have been known to the
Army since at least July 1973, and available to the
general public in Fluke's published brochures; and the
prices for their standard off-the-shelf multimeters,
meeting or exceeding the capabilities of the specified
Fluke model, are less than that quoted by Fluke. In
addition, the 5-month production lead time cited by the
contracting officer appears to be of questionable
validity.
In fact, GAO determined that 50 such multimeters
could be obtained from Fluke within 30-90 days. N-L
suggested that competitors of the Fluke model could deliver
within 30 days.
Counsel for the Army sought to justify MICOM's action
by quoting a previous GAO decision:
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We have also held that where the legitimate needs
of the Government can be satisfied from only a single
source, the law does not require that those needs be
compromised in order to obtain competition. [30]
GAO refuted the Army's contention , in the following excerpt:
This decision does not justify the actions of MICOM
in the instant case. The item involved in the procurement
under consideration was one which the protesting company
would have to develop. In the instant case, the protest-
ing companies contend that they and other manufacturers
could have met the legitimate needs of MICOM for a multi-
meter without development since an off-the-shelf item is
what is required and that is what Fluke is offering and
what they would offer.
GAO in further assessing the Army position, quoted yet another
previous decision, which is pertinent:
Neither is the fact that Fluke has provided MICOM
with satisfactory multimeters in the past justification
for negotiating with only Fluke. This office has held
that the fact that an instrument manufactured by one
company has proven satisfactory in use is not sufficient
basis to exclude others where the evidence indicates
that they have the ability to meet the agency's needs.
[21]
As to MICOM' s refusal to release the RFP to inter-
ested parties, DAR explicitly states:
When a solicitation for proposals has been limited
as a result of a determination that only a specified firm
or firms possess the capability to meet the requirements
of a procurement, requests for proposals shall be mailed
or otherwise provided upon request to firms not solicited,
but only after advice has been given to the firm making
the request as to the reasons for the limited solicitations
and the unlikelihood of any other firm being able to
qualify for a contract award under the circumstances.
[38:1002.1]
GAO, referencing the above DAR clause, stated that
MICOM' s actions were in violation of the DAR, and excluded
Data Precision from the competition.
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h. Although priority designation 02 is sufficient
authority for contracting officers to negotiate under the
public exigency exception, rather than formally advertise,
such urgency does not give contracting officers authority to
negotiate with only one source, where other sources can meet
the agency's needs. Applicable regulations require solicita-
tion of proposals, including price, from a maximum number of
qualified sources, consistent with the nature and requirements
of supplies to be procured, and the time limitations involved.
Additionally, when a sole-source RFP is listed in the Commerce
Business Daily, and an interested party is unable to obtain
a copy of the solicitation after reasonable efforts to do so,
failure of the agency to comply with such a request is a vio-
lation of DAR 1-1002.1.
i. The contracting agency was greatly in error on two
counts: (1) Restriction of the solicitation to a sole source
was not justified and (2) failure to furnish copies of the
RFP after publication in the CBD, was a blatant violation of
DAR. Both of these actions had the effect of unnecessarily
restricting competition, even considering the urgency of
requirement. In fact, the requirement could have been satis-
fied sooner, if it had simply been formally advertised.
j. GAO recommended cancellation of the RFP, and
resolicitation on an unrestricted basis. (Recommendation 2)
17. Case 9 . B-184662, May 25, 1976
a. Protest of award
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
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c. United Power and Control Systems, Inc.
d. Supply of 2,500 KVA substations
e. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Davisville,
Rhode Island
f. Improper application of evaluation criteria (9)
g. United Power and Control Systems, Inc. protested
the proposed award of any contract, for supply of 2,500 KVA
substations, emanating from IFB N62578-75-B-0123 , issued by
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Davisville, Rhode
Island, during the month of January 197 5.
United 's protest alleged that its bid had been
unfairly evaluated, and the basis upon which the Navy deter-
mined it to be nonresponsive was unfounded.
Subsequent to United 's protest being filed, the award
was made to the Abbott Power Corporation.
The requirements of the IFB stated that previous
experience was a prerequisite for a bid to be considered
responsive. Specifically, three substations of the type to
be provided, which had operated 10,000 hours during a period
of less than five years, had to be verified as qualification
for the IFB. "Substations" were defined by the IFB as inclu-
ding a 15KV and/or 5KV switchgear section, a 2,000 to 2,500
KVA transformer section, and a 480 volt, circuit protective
switchgear section, assembled together as an integral outdoor
type, three phase, 60 HZ substation.
Five bids were received. The low bid was from United,
the second low bid from Abbott. United identified eight
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substations which it felt satisfied the IFB requirements, five
of which were above 2,000 KVA. These five units had operated
approximately 10,000; 3,300; 7,000; 5,087; and 2,000 hours
respectively, and were rated at 2,500 KVA. Since only one, not
three, had been operated more than 10,000 hours, the Navy
determined United 's bid to be nonresponsive.
United stated that the five 2,500 KVA substations
listed in its bid were units that Navy officials had told
United had operated more than 10,000 hours. These had been
supplied by United to the Navy on a previous contract (referred
to as the -0019 contract). In this regard, United states that
it queried the procuring activity to provide information neces-
sary to comply with the IFB requirements. United was referred
to- a Navy field activity which, in turn, gave United the
serial numbers of the five substations listed in the IFB. After
bid opening, United had identified three 2,500 KVA units which
had, in fact, been operated for more than 10,000 hours.
The Navy asserted that, even though United had been
given erroneous information by its officials, it was incumbent
upon the bidder to insure that its bid complied with the
requirements of the IFB, and that late submission could not
be accepted
.
It should be noted that the Navy was in dispute with
United over operation of the previously supplied substations.
The Navy asserted that most of these units were unsafe, and
recuired excessive maintenance.
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It was noted by GAO that Abbott's units did not meet
the IFB specifications either, in that the switching units
were only rated at 460 volts, and not 480 volts, as required.
In addition, Abbott's substations were rated at 2,000 to
2,30 KVA and paragraph 3.7.2 of the IFB specifically
required no less than a 2,500 KVA rated transformer section.
In addressing the deficiencies in this acquisition,
GAO first discussed the responsiveness of United' s bid:
While the Navy claims that United 's listed units
cannot be viewed as "successfully" operating for over
10,000 hours under paragraph C.17 due to the many
deficiencies which have been listed in the Navy reports,
we are not persuaded that United f s units necessarily
do not meet this criterion. In the absence of a contrary
definition, if a substation operates over 10,000 hours
within 5 years, during which time it performs functions
for which it was designed, it could reasonably be con-
cluded that the substation has operated "successfully"
under paragraph C.17. Although the Navy has recently
decided that United 's units cannot be safely operated
over 5 KV, the substations eventually listed by United
apparently performed the functions for which they were
designed for over 10,000 hours within 5 years. This is
not to say that United could not have been rejected as
a nonresponsible prospective contractor under applicable
regulations, provided that the Navy could reasonably
support such a determination.
As to why the United bid was nonresponsive, GAO indi-
cated that the Navy was to blame:
Although the Navy does not deny that its officials
gave United wrong information regarding substation
experience, it asserts that it was United 's responsibility
to prepare its bid, and that United cannot later supplement
its bid in an attempt to make it responsive. However, it
would appear that the operational experience of United'
s
substations was information peculiarly within the Navy's
possession, since the -0019 contract substations were
scattered throughout the world in various Navy installa-
tions and that United' s "nonresponsiveness" was the
result of erroneous information from the Navy officials
to whom United was referred by the procuring activity
and upon whom United was entitled to rely.
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Finally, in comparing the evaluation criteria used for
the United bid as compared to the Abbott bid:
Therefore , it would appear, from the subparagraph
C.17.B. definition of "substation" that the substations
listed as operating over 10,000 hours did not have to
be identical to the units in the IFB purchase description.
Apparently, the listed substations could vary from the
basic salient characteristics of the substation called
for in the IFB purchase description. The foregoing
implies that the requirements were not directed at the
capability of the actual "item being procured" but
rather at the bidder's past demonstrated ability to
deliver a successfully operating similar model.
Therefore, we conclude that the Navy acted arbi-
trarily in rejecting United 1 s bid as nonresponsive to
the experience clause requirements when it did not
reject Abbott's bid.
h. (1) Where the low bidder's nonresponsiveness to a
solicitation experience clause is the result of erroneous
information, peculiarly within the agency's possession, from
said agency's officials upon whom the bidder is entitled to
rely, the agency has acted arbitrarily in rejecting the low
bid, when award has been made to the second low bidder.
(2) In the case where one bid is rejected as meeting
the requirements of a solicitation, and another bid, which
also does not meet all the required specifications, is
accepted, the contracting agency has made an erroneous evalu-
ation, and is in danger of being reprimanded for prejudicial
practices
.
i. The contracting agency was at fault—for three
reasons: CD the IFB was poorly written and ambiguous,
(2) the treatment of United was obviously unfair and (3) the
evaluation emanated prejudicial practices in rejecting one
bid, and accepting another which was also nonresponsive.
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j
.
GAO stated that the contracting procedures in this
case were so defective that corrective action would be recom-
mended, but for the advanced state of contract performance.
(Recommendation 4)
18. Case 10
.
B-185515, February 24, 1976, 55 Comp Gen 798
a. Protest of solicitation
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Atlantic Maintenance Company
d. Provide janitorial services
e. Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Va.
f. Solicitation errors and changes (10)
g. Atlantic Maintenance Company, Inc. protested the
cancellation and resolicitation of IFB N62470-76-B-0560 for
janitorial services, issued by the Norfolk Naval Shipyard on
December 9, 1975.
Atlantic had protested against award on the original
solicitation on the basis that the low bidder, CFE Air Cargo
Company, failed to post a proper bond and should have been
ruled nonresponsive.
The contracting agency, in investigating this protest,
decided that CFE ' s low bid was a result of ambiguities in
the IFB, which had to do with the bid security requirements.
The cover of the bid package stated:
Your bid must be accompanied by a bid security for
20% of the highest amount for which the award can be
made.
The schedule on page 1 of NAVFAC Form 4330/24 contains
the statement under the space for the grand total per month:
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Bid bond required in the amount of 20% of bid.
Page 2 of the form states:
Bid bond in the amount of 20% of total bid is required.
The Navy maintained that CFE literally complied with
the provisions as listed in the IFB, by submitting 20% of
the monthly amount, yet the cover sheet referred to the length
of the contract as twelve months, which would require 12 times
the CFE bond than was posted. The Navy argued that the IFB,
therefore, was ambiguous, and it was cancelled for
resolicitation.
GAO did not agree with the resolicitation, and ren-
dered the following decision:
Section 1.C.3 states that award will be based on the
grand total price of items listed on the schedule multi-
plied by 12. A 12-month contract was contemplated and the
term "total bid" would seem to be the 12-month basis.
Any reference to a "total bid" necessarily seems to have
reference to the 12-month price. The legend on the cover
of the bid package also clearly referred to the amount
to be bid for the entire year's work.
Only the statement on the schedule poses a problem.
The statement that the bid bond was required to be 20
percent of "bid" might be interpreted as the Navy would
have it, if one were to look only at the schedule. If
the schedule were considered in isolation, the statement,
"bid bond required in the amount of 20% of bid" might
itself be ambiguous in that a reader could interpret
the statement to refer to the grand total price for 1
month or the price for the 12-months of performance.
However, in the context of a bid package which contemplates
a 12-month contract, which indicates award will be made on
12-month basis and which contains two other references
to a "total bid" and a third to a highest amount for
which award can be made, it seems that the word "bid" in
the statement on the face of the schedule must be the
"total bid" in context, I.E., the total price bid for
the 12-month award. That this conclusion is reasonable
is supported by the fact that three out of four bidders
on this IFB submitted bid bonds equal to 20 percent of
the full 12-month price. Accordingly, we conclude,
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contrary to the agency, that no ambiguity existed in
the bid documents when viewed as a whole.
As the above decision required reinstatement of the
original solicitation, the matter of CFE ' s responsiveness
was considered:
With respect to the initial allegation of Atlantic
that the bid of CFE was nonresponsive, we note that CFE
provided a cashier's check for 20 percent of 1 month's
price or $13,330, in lieu of a bond for that amount.
We also note that 20 percent of the total bid of CFE,
I.E., 20 percent of the monthly price multiplied by 12,
would amount to $159,937.61. Thus, the guaranty
proffered by CFE was significantly less than the require-
ment. In such situations we have held that the failure
of a bid to comply with the bid guarantee provisions
requires the rejection of the bid as nonresponsive and
that the failure may not be waived or otherwise excused.
[15]
h. When a solicitation document specifies a defini-
tive periodicity for the subsequent contract, with a bid
security required, and the solicitation contains references
to both monthly and total bid securities, the solicitation
is not necessarily ambiguous, and the bid security must be
posted for the entire period of the contract, or the bid is
to be rejected as nonresponsive.
i. The contracting agency erred in its recall of
the initial solicitation, because bid securities must always
be based upon the total time period involved, and the
security value will be some fixed percentage specified in
the solicitation document, of the total price. The contrac-
tor, CFE, erred by knowingly submitting a bid security
which related only to one month of the 12-month period of
the contract specified in the IFB.
87

j. Two decisions were required of GAO. First, the
original solicitation was to be reinstated (Recommendation
10) and secondly, in reverting back to the original bids,
CFE had to be considered nonresponsive. (Recommendation 7)
19. Case 11 . B-189073, October 7, 1977
a. Bid protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Regional Construction Company, Inc.
d. Construction of a warehouse
e. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Omaha, Nebraska
f. Affirmative Action criteria (11)
g. Regional Construction Company, Inc. protested the
rejection of its bid as nonresponsive on IFB DACA45-77-B-
0034, issued by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha.
The IFB solicited construction of a warehouse at O'Hare
International Airport, Chicago. Regional' s bid was rejected
because it failed to submit minority manpower utilization
goals, which were required by the IFB in accordance with the
Chicago Plan, a mandatory Affirmative Action plan imposed by
the Department of Labor.
Regional argues that its bid was responsive, and that
as lowest bidder it should have been awarded the contract.
Although Regional did not submit a separate sheet, listing
its percentage goals for minority manpower utilization as
required by the IFB, it did express a commitment to the
Chicago Plan in a letter accompanying the bid.
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The issue is whether, or not, the agreement to imple-
ment the Chicago Plan was a commitment to the requirements of
the IFB.
GAO determined that since Regional agreed to abide
by Amendment 3 of the IFB, it was in compliance. Amendment
3 states that:
Bidders are reminded that bids are to be accompanied
by an affirmative action plan (Chicago plan)
.
This amendment, by definition referred to the Chicago
Plan, which was included in the IFB beginning on page one.
Thus, the requirements of the IFB, and a commitment
to the Chicago Plan are one and the same thing. GAO ruled
Regional 's bid to be responsive, and identified some past
precedents
:
Bidder can commit itself to the requirements of an
affirmative action plan in a manner other than that
specified in the solicitation as long as the bidder
manifests a definite commitment to those requirements.
[12]
This is true despite the fact that solicitations,
such as the one in the instant case, often contain
statements which warn bidders that failure to comply
with a particular requirements will result in the
rejection of their bid as nonresponsive. We have
determined that such statements often establish the
materiality of that requirement, but that the require-
ment is not necessarily material solely because it is
accompanied by that warning. [25]
h. Failure of a low bidder to submit a separate
sheet listing percentage goals for minority manpower utiliza-
tion, does not render a bid nonresponsive, when the bidder
submits a letter attached to the bid expressing a commitment
to an Affirmative Action Plan which contains such goals.
The issue of responsiveness is measured by the bidder's
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commitment to a plan, and not by the bidder's failure to
accurately follow instructions of an IFB.
i. The error contained in this case bears upon the
contracting agency's insistence on procedure , instead of a
commitment to the requirements of the IFB, and Governmental
interests in minority manpower utilization. Regional, in
committing to the Chicago Plan, had complied with the spirit
of affirmative action, if not to procedural requirements,
which is exactly the point of including the requirement in
the IFB, in the first place.
j. GAO recommended reinstatement of Regional' s bid,
with subsequent award, as Regional was the lowest responsive
bidder. (Recommendations 8 and 3)
20. Case 12 , B-183957, October 6, 1975, 55 Comp Gen 352
a. Award protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Commercial Sanitation Service
d. Refuse Collection and Disposal service
e. Department of the Army, Fort Carson, Colorado
f. DAR revision required (12)
g. Commercial Sanitation Service protests the rejec-
tion of its bid as nonresponsive, under IFB DAKF06-75-B-0106
issued by the Department of the Army on March 7, 1975, for
refuse collection and sanitation service. Commercial sub-
mitted the low bid of $187,962 with a prompt payment discount
of 8%, if payment was made within 30 days. This reduced the
bid to $172,925. Dynamic International submitted the next
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lowest bid of $196,500 with discount of 10%; effective price,
$176,850.
The IFB required each bidder to post a bid guaranty
of 20% of its bid price. Commercial posted $34,585, and was
subsequently ruled as nonresponsive by the contracting
officer, for failure to submit a sufficient bond. The impli-
cation was that Commercial's bond should have been in the
amount of $37,592.40, v/hich was 20% of its bid price before
discount.
Commercial contended that if the net bid after dis-
count were the basis for the award, then that figure should
also be the basis for the bid bond.
The contracting activity took the position that term
discounts must be earned and not assumed.
Commercial refuted the agency by quoting DAR:
Any discount offered shall be deducted from the bid
price if a prompt payment discount is offered for payment
within 20 days. [38 : 2-407 . 3 (B)
]
Since, per DAR, the bid was to be evaluated on the dis-
count price, the above argument for Commercial still holds.
GAO had never reviewed a case of this nature before,
but agreed with the contractor. Referring to the DAR clause
previously stated, GAO noted that the offered discount forms
part of the award price, and therefore should be considered
in the bond requirement.
A further ramification of this case, identified by
GAO, was whether the contracting officer could have found
another solution. Again, DAR is drawn upon:
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Non-compliance with bid guarantee requirements. When
a solicitation requires that bid be supported by a bid
guarantee, non-compliance with such requirement will
require rejection of the bid, except that rejection of
the bid is not required in these situations.
When the amount of the bid guarantee submitted,
though less than the amount required by the IFB, is equal
to or greater than the difference between the price
stated in the bid and the price stated in the next higher
acceptable bid. [38:10-102.5(11)]
The Army position is that this exception is discretion-
ary upon the contracting officer.
GAO has ruled that:
Absent a specific finding, which was not made here,
that a waiver of the requirement was not in the best
interests of the Government, the bid should not be
rejected if it falls into the stated exception. To rule
otherwise would permit unbridled discretion to totally
defeat the purpose of the exception and allow its
employment as a substitute for rejecting bids for unre-
lated reasons such as nonresponsibility determination.
It is our view that since the failure of the bid to
comply fully with the invitation requirements falls within
one of the exceptions enumerated in ASPR, and there was
no finding that its acceptance would in any way be detri-
mental to the best interest of the Government, or
prejudice the rights it would otherwise have, the low bid
should be regarded as responsive.
h. Two major lessons learned emerge from this case:
(1) Since DAR provides that prompt payment dis-
counts be deducted from the bid price on the assumption that
the discount will be taken, and the offered discount will
affect the award price, the amount of the required bid bond
may properly be based upon the discounted bid price.
(2) DAR gives contracting officers discretionary
authority to decide if bid bond deficiencies should be
waived, but such discretion was intended for application
within definite rules. Consequently, unless not in the best
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interests of the Government, and the bid falls into the DAR
exception for bid guarantee, the exception should be utilized.
i. The protest occurred as a result of DAR language,
and existing procedures. No case of this nature had ever been
reviewed by GAO, and operating procedures in relation to bid
bond prices, when discounts are involved was not, at best,
discretionary. A GAO determination within the body of this
case has solved that dilemma. The use of the bid bond excep-
tion in DAR, which could have been used to satisfy this case,
is discretionary as written. The language should be changed
so that use of the exception is mandatory. The aim here is
to maintain consistency in practices, which is a great deter-
rent to further protests.
j . GAO recommended termination of the present con-
tract, and award to the protestor. (Recommendations 1 and 3)
Additionally, a recommendation was submitted to the
DAR committee of the Department of Defense, recommending that
the language of DAR section 10-102.5 be revised so that it is
no longer discretionary on the part of the contracting officer
whether to accept a bid, if the bid bond is deficient, but
falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. (No recommen-
dation number, since it does not directly affect the contract.)
21. Case 13 . B-187113, November 24, 1976
a. Award protest
b. Request for Proposals (RFP)
c. Fordel Films Inc.
d. Production of a motion picture
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e. Navy Regional Contracting Office (NRCO)
,
Washington, D.C.
f. Negotiation prior to submittal of best and
final offers (13)
g. Fordel Films Incorporated protested the award of
a contract under RFP N 00600-76-R-5377 , issued by NRCO,
Washington, D.C, for production of a motion picture.
Fourteen proposals, each with a fixed price offer,
and a cost breakdown were received by April 23, 1976, the
closing date. Production House Inc., the eventual awardee,
submitted an offer of $22,850, which was further reduced to
$19,940 by a proper modification. On April 26, in a tele-
phone conversation, NRCO requested Production House to ex-
plain the modifications, which led to further reductions
and more conversations, eventually resulting in a bid price
of $19,345. At the same time, Fordel was requested to con-
firm its $21,289 offer, so that, as the second low offeror,
prompt award could be made to it, should Production House
prove to be nonresponsible. Fordel confirmed its price, but
acknowledged the omission of certain costs in its proposal.
Award was made to Production House for $19,345, on April 29.
Fordel' s protest alleged that all price reductions
made by Production House after its initial bid of $22,850
were made by telephone, contrary to the solicitation require-
ments, and that award should have been made to Fordel for its
bid price of $21,289.
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The contracting agency admits that the negotiations
were improper. However, at the time the telephone conversa-
tions occurred, agency personnel did not view them as nego-
tiations, but merely as corrections and clarifications which
did not require requests for best and final offers.
Both GAO and NRCO agreed that these discussions did,
in fact, constitute negotiations with Production House, that
best and final offers should have been requested, and that
award should not have been made without requesting such
offers
.
h. Telephone conversations in a negotiated procure-
ment should not be used as a vehicle for negotiation, prior
to requests for best and final offers. A series of clarifi-
cations of price modifications can take on this aspect, and
must be guarded against.
i. The negotiator and contracting officer were at
fault in not requesting best and final offers from both con-
tractors, and then negotiating. As this case evolved, price
modification clarifications resulted in lowering of the
Production House bid, and were essentially negotiations.
The end result was that Fordel was, unintentionally, but
effectively, underbid as a result of negotiations conducted
with Production House prior to submittal of best and
final offers from either firm. It is also possible that
through proper negotiations, a lower price may have been
attained by the Government.
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j. GAO recommended that the award stand, since it
was made in good faith to the low bidder, was more than 7 5%
complete, and the protestor was allowed to submit a final
offer. But, both NRCO and GAO were in agreement that the
negotiations conducted prior to requesting best and final
offers were improper. (Recommendation 4)
22. Case 14 . B-184451, B-184394, June 1, 1976
a. Award protest
b. Invitation for Bids (IFB)
c. Kepner Plastic Fabricators, Inc.
d. Provide floating oil containment booms
e. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and Naval
Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
f. Required certifications (SBA, ICC, etc.) (14)
g. Kepner Plastic Fabricators, Inc. protested the
award of a contract to Max-Vac, Inc., under IFB N62578-75-B-
0139 issued by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) , or under IFB N00024-75-B-4602 , issued by the Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , for oil containment booms.
On June 11, 197 5, bids were opened by NAVFAC, and
Max-Vac was determined to be the low bidder at $184,826.30,
with Kepner second lowest, at $208,707.80.
In response to IFB 4602 (NAVSEA) , Max-Vac, again
was low at $8 4,600, and Kepner was second low at $99,900.
A pre-award survey team recommended that no award be made
to Max-Vac because of inadequate financial resources. Be-
cause Max-Vac was a small business concern, such a determination
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had to be made by the Small Business Administration (SBA)
,
The SBA subsequently issued a Certificate of Competency
(COC) reflecting the determination that Max-Vac possessed
adequate capacity and credit to perform.
Kepner has protested against award to Max-Vac
stating, in part, that Max-Vac has never produced the items
involved, that Max-Vac's bid should be considered nonrespon-
sive, since it was unable to supply "Regular Commercial
Products" as specified in the IFB, and that Max-Vac is non-
responsible for lack of experience.
The concerns of Kepner were also the concerns of the
procuring commands. NAVFAC states:
The oil booms to be produced under its invitation
are essential in that they will be used to contain oil
spills occurring in rivers, lakes, harbors, and even
the open ocean. Failures in the booms could result in
spilled oil not being contained, with widespread
diversion of the spillage and consequent substantial
damage to the environment and wildlife.
Completely separate and apart from the question
of whether or not any firm is responsible, NAVFAC has
determined that it is so essential that any oil booms
purchased operate satisfactorily, that it cannot be
the GUINEA pig for a hitherto untested product.
NAVFAC would take this position even in a case where
the low bidder has unquestionable capacity and
financial resources to accomplish the manufacture.
Conversely, NAVSEA states that the "Regular Commercial
Product" clause:
Was included in the specification to assist in
assuring that only a capable, qualified manufacturer
would be selected. As such, question of whether the
product offered is a regular commercial one relates
to the responsibility of the bidder rather than to
responsiveness
.
NAVSEA suggested that award to Max-Vac would there-
fore be proper, since that company had been determined to

be responsible by the SBA. NAVFAC did not agree, and
expressed great concern that the product produced might be
inadequate, regardless of the capacity or financial resources
of the firm, and that, therefore, the issue was responsive-
ness, and not responsibility.
GAO was more inclined toward the NAVFAC point of view
It is clear that Max-Vac's unqualified bid obligates
that firm to provide a "Regular Commercial Product." In
this connection, we do not agree with NAVSEA's suggestion
that award to Max-Vac would be proper even if it could
not furnish a commercial product. A willingness to
proceed with awards under these solicitations even if a
bidder cannot supply a "Regular Commercial Product"
would indicate that the "Standard Product" clause was
unnecessary. [13]
GAO expressed further concern that perhaps the COC
issued by SBA did not address the matter of responsiveness
at all. This matter would be critical in the selection of
any awardee:
Under these circumstances, cancellation of the soli-
citation and readvertisement without the clause would be
in order. In fact, the SBA has issued a COC which
reflects a determination by that agency that Max-Vac
has the "capacity" to manufacture these oil containment
booms. It is not clear from the record, however, to
what extent SBA considered the "Standard Product"
clause in making its determination. The referral to
SBA for a COC was prompted by doubts as to Max-Vac '
s
financial condition, and it does not appear that the
firm's ability to comply with the "Standard Product"
clause was an issue at that time. It was not until
Kepner filed its protest before our office that this
issue was developed.
h. Two essential lessons are learned from this case.
Both address the responsibility and responsiveness issues
raised:
(1) If the record does not reflect the extent
to which the SBA considered "Regular Commercial Product"
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requirements of a solicitation in issuing a COC to a bidder,
and only the bidder's financial status was in question at
time of COC referral, then contracting agencies should ask
SBA to reconsider its issuance of a COC, if the bidder's
capability to meet the solicitation requirement had not been
examined previously.
(2) A small business" unqualified bid obligates
that firm to provide a "Regular Commercial Product" as required
by the solicitation. Award to that bidder must be preceded
by a determination that the bidder will offer a "Regular
Commercial Product." If an agency's needs can be met by other
than a "Regular Commercial Product," the requirement was unduly
restrictive and the acquisition should be readvertised without
it.
i. The problem identified in this case has to do with
SBA determinations, and contracting agencies and officers'
concerns. If a small business requires SBA certification, it
is incumbent upon the contracting personnel to insure that
the SBA obtain the correct determination. As in this case,
a determination of responsiveness is unacceptable, if only
a determination of responsibility will suffice. Communication
between contracting and SBA personnel is imperative.
j . GAO recommended that the Procuring Agencies
contact the SBA, and get a determination of responsibility
for Max-Vac. (Recommendation 6)
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C . SUMMARY
This chapter focused on 22 cases which had been identified
as representative of the population of protests reviewed and
sustained by GAO. Each case represented a unique protest
reason, and was evaluated as an example of the cases contained
within each of the 22 different categories and sub-categories.
The results of this analysis will be further developed in
Chapter V as lessons learned, or conclusions.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. PREFACE
Twenty-two selected cases which GAO had sustained as a
result of their protest reviewing process were presented and
2
analyzed." All of these cases emanated from the DOD acqui-
sition and contracting process during the years 1975 through
1978. Drawing from the research accomplished for these
efforts, the following two subsections will consolidate the
accomplishments of this study through the research questions
3
which served to direct the analysis. In subchapter V.B.
the emphasis was to determine if an analysis could be conduc-
ted from which meaningful conclusions could be drawn which
had the potential to reduce future protests. The follow-on
question, presented as subchapter V.C., was to determine
what conclusions, or lessons learned, could be derived from
such an analysis.
B, DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH QUESTION 1
The thrust of this study was presented in the following
form: CAN MEANINGFUL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED BE
DRAWN FROM A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINED GAO PROTEST
DECISIONS?
It is believed that meaningful conclusions can be drawn
for the acquisition process using the methodology of
this study. Each of the 22 cases analyzed provided
2
Subchapter IV. B Case Analysis
Subchapter 1.3. Objectives and Research Questions
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insight into trends of causes, which permeate all the cate-
gories of protest. It is the identification of these trends
that has the most potential value in reducing the quantity
of protests. References such as DAR and Government Contract
Law (GCL) give guidance to the acquisition process, but they
cannot provide the day-to-day practical lessons to be learned,
that a study such as this can provide. The individual appli-
cation of GAO decisions to real world situations, communicates
to the acquisition manager the dynamics of the acquisition
process. It more clearly defines for him what he, as an
individual, can or should do to improve the process. Reduc-
tion in the number of protests is but one of those improve-
ments
.
The following lessons are offered in support of this
research question:
1 . Lesson 1
Nine of the 22 cases contained elements of overly
strict, or arbitrary interpretations on the part of contracting
personnel. In most cases, these interpretations directly
resulted in a very negative recommendation by GAO, which im-
pacted upon the contracting agency concerned.
Case lb illustrated a good example of an agency attemp-
ting to stretch a previous GAO decision in its determination
of responsiveness on a bid. Extension of the GAO decision
to option quantities had never been intended, and was found
to be at fault.
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Case lc identified another determination of responsive-
ness question. In this case, the total bid was clear, but
the agency placed unnecessary emphasis on the ambiguous unit
prices, creating work for itself, and alienating a responsive
bidder
.
Case 3b dealt with a determination of nonresponsive-
ness because the bidder added more to its bid than necessary.
Again, a perfectly good bid was thrown out, until GAO rein-
stated it.
Case 5a had to do with use of an overly restrictive
interpretation, in order to cover up an agency error, direct-
ly causing a bid protest.
Case 8a was unique in that it dealt with a BOA rather
than an IFB or RFP. The result, however, was the same.
Overly strict interpretation of a DAR clause led to elimina-
tion of a surplus supply part bidder, who was subsequently
I
determined by GAO to have the right to bid on such a contract.
Case 8b was an excellent illustration of an agency
closing its ears to higher authority and proceeding, using
a subservient regulation as authority, which was in direct
conflict with higher regulation authority. This action led
directly to a protest which GAO subsequently sustained.
In Case 3d, the agency erroneously used urgency of
the requirement as a basis for sole-source negotiation. The
conclusion of this case is extremely interesting, in that
the action of the agency actually created a delay in obtaining
the urgent material. Some viable sources were eliminated by
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the sole-source determination, which could have provided the
needed supplies in a shorter period of time.
Case 11, dealing with affirmative action, clearly
showed the narrow-mindedness of the agency's actions. Strict
adherence to a procedure, deemed absolute, nearly eliminated
several responsive bidders who had, by definition of GAO,
complied with the IFB by indicating their commitment to the
Affirmative Action Plan specified in the solicitation document.
Lastly, Case 12 showed yet another example of a con-
tracting agency eliminating a responsive (in fact, the low)
bidder by unfounded adherence to an arbitrary decision allowed
by DAR.
2. Lesson 2
The exercise of prudent business practices by contract-
ing personnel, coupled with a fundamental knowledge of the
contracting process and contract law, are necessary ingredi-
ents for successful acquisitions. Seven cases emerged from
which these fundamentals were absent and protests resulted.
Case lb illustrated the point in reference to deter-
mining a bid to be responsive, when no consistent pricing
pattern exists. A prudent business or common sense approach
would have indicated otherwise.
In Case lc, adherence to demanding that unit prices
be unambigious, when a valid total price had been submitted
by the bidder, and the subsequent award was to be made on
the total price bid, appears wasteful.
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The lack of good business management in Case 8d was
not only imprudent, it was a flagrant violation of DAR proce-
dures. Failure to issue RFP ' s to interested parties, after a
sole-source determination is listed in the CBD, contravenes
the DAR and represents complete disregard for the contractors
interests
.
In Case 9, the contracting agency treated United
Power and Control Systems, Inc. unfairly, because previous
experience with this company had created a strained
relationship.
In Case 10, the contracting agency withdrew a valid
IFB, thinking that an ambiguity in the solicitation document
in regard to bid bonds confused the bidders. Knowledge of
the fact that bid bonds must be posted for the entire period
of the contract to be awarded, regardless of the IFB pro-
visions, would have prevented an unnecessary action, which
resulted in a protest to GAO.
The action of the contracting agency in Case 11 was
a manifestation of procedural mentality overriding the
benefit to be derived from having contractors commit to
affirmative action programs. Fifty percent of the qualified
bidders were considered nonresponsive, merely because they
did not follow the step-by-step, methodological approach
elicited in the IFB. In this case, however, GAO exhibited
the good business sense to reverse the agency's nonresponsive
determinations
.
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In Case 11, negotiations were conducted by telephone,
under the guise of price modifications and clarifications,
prior to requests for submittals of best and final offers.
3
.
Lesson 3
Eight cases were identified which exhibited inconsis-
tencies in dealings with various contractors. Other terms
which are often heard represent these inconsistencies:
Failure to maintain a competitive balance; lack of fair and
equitable treatment; not presenting a single face to industry;
and discrimination. Of the eight cases, three are represen-
tative of the others.
In Case 3a, use of one of the bidder's drawings as a
design requirement in the IFB, clearly discriminated against
all other offerors.
In Case 5c, the contracting officer had erroneously
released bid prices of one bidder to another. Recognizing
this, he was then walking a tightrope in trying to maintain
a competitive balance. In the end, he failed, even though
he made good efforts not to.
Case 13, previously mentioned, dealt with negotiation
by telephone, prior to requests for best and final offers.
This practice also led to unbalanced competition, and favored
the company with whom the negotiations were, inadvertently,
conducted.
4
.
Lesson 4
Six major contracting errors were noted, all of which
were the root cause of the associated protests. Two of the
cases, 3b and 7, represent the thrust of these errors.
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In Case 3b, the contracting agency rejected a perfectly
valid bid, because the bid contained more information than was
required in the solicitation. However, if the contract were
awarded to this offeror, he would be bound by the provisions
of the solicitation anyway. This is an obvious error.
In Case 7, the contracting officer made a nonrespon-
sive determination, based upon a study which contained erro-
neous assumptions. This is a good example of a contracting
"team" error.
5 . Lesson 5
Lack of control of the contracting team, by the con-
tracting officer, can also cause protests. Case 7, already
mentioned, represents the outer fringes of the problem. Two
other cases, however, represent control situations much
closer, within the contracting officer's realm of influence.
In Case 3b, a survey team member told the contractor,
Nordham, to submit a proposal including the honeycomb coring.
Later, this same member advised the PCO that Nordham' s bid
was nonresponsive, because it was not contained within the
prescribed limits of the IFB.
In Case 9, although his actions may have been agency
induced, the Navy representative called upon to provide
serial numbers of substations which had successfully operated
for 10,000 hours, in support of United's current bid, supplied
information which was erroneous.
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6.
Lesson 6
Twice within this study, it was determined that pro-
tests will occur unless GAO decisions are disseminated to the
contracting agencies as quickly as possible.
In Case 4, no agency nor person was to blame for the
protest. GAO recommended that the agency pursue the meaning
of the recent ICC Bud's decision with regard to agents'
Certification of Operating Authority, if the parent company
is licensed and the subsidiary is not. This decision was
the basis for the protest, and dissemination of this case
made the information available to all the contracting
agencies
.
In Case 12, GAO discussed the subject of bid bonds
based upon discounts. Since this was a completely new area
of endeavor for GAO, no past precedent existed. This decision
by GAO is, in fact, a deterrent to future protests of this
nature.
7. Lesson 7
Poor and lethargic management practices or policies
were identified as the root cause for three protests.
In Case 9, the FAMC mail policies were allowed to
continue, even though late bids would result. In Case 8d,
MICOM's obvious disregard for the DAR provisions, and its
adherence to negotiating a sole-source contract, represent
a very poor management example. Both were detrimental to
the agency; the first to its image, the second to the integ-
rity of the contracting mechanism and, ironically, to the
expediency of the urgently required acquisition.
108

8.
Lesson 8
Poor communications contributed to the submittal of
protests in three cases. Two of these are representative.
In Case 7, a communication failure allowed an exacting
study to be conducted, which ultimately was the basis of a
nonresponsive determination, which was based upon an erroneous
assumption. Failure to communicate properly between contract-
ing officer, the study team, and the contractor resulted in
wasteful efforts for all, and a delayed contract award.
In Case 14, the failure of the contracting agency to
communicate with the SBA, resulted in a determination of
responsiveness only when a determination of responsibility
was also needed.
9
.
Lesson 9
The need for improved regulations and procedures was
the basis for protests in four cases.
Cases 6 and 12 resulted from needed changes in the
DAR which emerged as GAO recommendations
.
Case 5b resulted from poor mail policy at FAMC, pre-
viously mentioned, which created a late bid situation.
Case 8c addressed the Navy's reluctance to use
Restricted Formal Advertising for mess attendant service
contracts, even though GAO had directed this change, and
both the Army and Air Force had previously done so to elimi-
nate the large protest volume resulting from negotiated
procurements
.
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C. DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH QUESTION 2
The second research question expands upon the first, and
attempts to transform the lessons learned into useful recom-
mendations: CAN THESE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED BE
TRANSFORMED INTO RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH, WHEN TRANSMITTED
TO ACQUISITION MANAGERS, HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO DECREASE
FUTURE PROTESTS AND IMPROVE TEE ACQUISITION PROCESS?
It is believed that such recommendations can be formu-
lated. They are the subject of Chapter VI.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY
A. PREFACE
Many imperfections in the acquisition and contracting
process have been identified by this study. In an attempt
to improve this process, recommendations based upon the
criticisms and lessons learned portions of this thesis,
Chapter IV, and particularly, upon the nine lessons learned
presented in the form of conclusions, Chapter V, will be
presented. These recommendations are of a general nature,
and are to be applied broadly. This is so, because the
conclusions drawn are not specific, and cannot be solved by
specific cures. In this chapter, areas requiring further
research are identified. There are some interrelationships
between recommendations, but only insofar as the conclusions
from which they are drawn are also interrelated.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Recommendation 1
It is recommended that Acquisition Managers focus on
improving communications, both within, and without their
organizations. This study identified many instances in which
poor communication was the root cause of the ultimate protest
Communication defined herein includes both education, and
open flows of information.
Specifically, Government Acquisition Managers should:
maintain close information exchanges between contracting team
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members, the contractors, and themselves, both within and
without their agencies; insure that new acquisition policies
formulated by Public Law, GAO and other Governmental Agency
decisions, are distributed in a timely manner; and maintain
an open dialogue with support agencies, such as SBA.
This research has shown a need for protest review
information to be disseminated to Acquisition Managers, so
as to improve the acquisition process. Unfortunately, the
present information available is not presented in the proper
language for this purpose. It is highly recommended that
case reviews be made available to the Acquisition Managers
in language such as that utilized within this study, and not
in the legal language understood fully, only by attorneys.
2
. Recommendation 2
It is recommended that Acquisition Managers strive
to operate at all times on a fair and equitable basis with
all contractors.
This study uncovered many instances in which this
ideal was violated, and has identified the following specific
areas requiring attention: arbitrary and overly strict
interpretations, those which have resulted from influences
within the contracting processes as specified in DAR, must
be avoided; attempts must be made to understand the problems
and motivations of the contractor; and in order to be able
to measure exactly what is fair and equitable, Acquisition
Managers must learn the basics of their profession and seek
out assistance when it is needed.
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3.
Recommendation 3
It is recommended that Acquisition Managers continu-
ously attempt to improve upon current policies, interpreta-
tions and procedures, to eliminate those which prove
counterproductive, or are in conflict with one another.
Lessons learned 8 and 10 defined the basis of this
recommendation.
Specifically, those regulations in DAR which are
found to be lacking, must be rewritten. Organizational or
Agency policies which cause detrimental results within the
acquisition process must be eliminated, or if necessary for
other purposes, modified. Regulations of differing Govern-
mental Agencies which are in conflict and affect the acquisi-
tion process, must be brought into agreement. Poor or
lethargic management practices at any level must not be
tolerated
.
It is further recommended that when policy and regula-
tion changes are specified by GAO to individual agencies or
committees, that those activities be required to report imple-
mentation compliance to GAO, when completed.
4 Recommendation 4
It is recommended that the following areas related to
this study be explored, to potentially increase understanding
and knowledge of the acquisition process:
a. Sustained protests of agencies other than DOD.
b. Protest appeals to the courts.
c. Protests reviewed by individual Procuring Agencies
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d. The impact of protests from the contractor's
viewpoint.
e. Denied, dismissed, or withdrawn protests.
f. Specific mechanisms for incorporating lessons
learned into the acquisition process.
g. Investigation into improvements of the available
protest data bases.
h. Updating of this study to the current date.
This list is not exhaustive, it presents some areas
which, at present, appear to be fertile ground for further
original research, related to the general subject of this
study.
C. SUMMARY
GAO protest reviews are a source of very beneficial
information which can improve the acquisition process. GAO
decisions are currently added to legal data bases used by
lawyers and by contracting personnel. The best potential
use of these decisions, for PCO's, is in deciding what actions
have become accepted, in the past, which bear upon present
or future contracting problems. The purpose of this study
was to analyze sustained GAO protest reviews and to determine
if meaningful conclusions could be established, in the form of
lessons learned. Much additional research would be beneficial
in this general area. Specifically, sustained protests of
agencies other than the Department of Defense, reviewed by
GAO, and sustained protests reviewed by individual contracting
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agencies within DOD, are promising avenues of further research
which have the potential to further refine the acquisition and
contracting processes.
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